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I. INTRODUCTION

A commentator writing on the subject of judicial independence once
suggested that "more sweat and ink have been spent on getting rid of judicial
elections than on any other single subject in the history of American law."'
Therefore, it should not have come as a shock to see several justices of the
United States Supreme Court add further fuel to the fire in the Court's recent
decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. 2 In White, the Court, in a
five-to-four decision, held that the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial
conduct that prohibited candidates for judicial election from announcing their
views on disputed legal or political issues violated the First Amendment. 3 Although the narrow issue in the case was the constitutionality of Minnesota's socalled "announce clause," the case raised broader and oft-debated issues concerning the tension between maintaining the impartiality and independence of
judges while simultaneously subjecting them to the process of running for office
every few years.4
Of particular interest is the fact that Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion is almost an exhortation to the states to abandon the practice of electing
judges. Although she agreed with the majority's ultimate conclusion that Minnesota's announce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve Minnesota's interest in preserving impartiality or the appearance of impartiality, O'Connor wrote5
separately "to express [her] concerns about judicial elections generally."

I
2

Roy A. Schotland, Comment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 149, 150.
536 U.S. 765 (2002).

3

Id. at 788.

4
See generally id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If the State has a problem with judicial
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly
electing judges.").
5
Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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O'Connor then proceeded to recite a litany of concerns about the popular election of judges voiced by critics.6
O'Connor's opinion prompted Justice Kennedy in his concurrence to
state that the Court "should refrain from criticism of the State's choice to use
open elections to select those persons most likely to achieve judicial excellence." 7 For Kennedy, the proper way for states to ensure that an individual has
the fitness to hold judicial office is not through the restriction of speech at the
front end of a judicial officer's career during the campaign. Instead, states can
more appropriately ensure fitness for office by regulating speech and conduct
during the judge's term. According to Kennedy, states may legitimately enshrine definitions of fitness for office in codes of judicial conduct and "adopt
recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges
who violate these standards." 8 However, "[d]eciding the relevance of candidate
speech is the right of the voters, not the State." 9
There are innumerable law review articles that critique the various
methods used by the states in selecting their judges, and the vast majority begin
with the assumption that popular election is the least desirable.' 0 This is not one
of those articles. Instead, this Article starts with the assumption that the popular
election of judges is a given in many states and will continue to be so for some
time to come. From that uncontroversial premise, it proceeds to explore Justice
Kennedy's suggestion as to how such states can best achieve the difficult task of
ensuring the existence of an ethical judiciary while simultaneously preserving
the public's right to select its own judges.
The discipline of judges from office has always presented difficult challenges. For many citizens, judges are the embodiment of the judicial system.
As such, it is natural that judges are held to a higher standard of conduct than
other public officials." On a practical level, discipline for judicial misconduct
12
is essential to protect the public from corruption and abuse of power by judges.
On a broader level, judicial discipline is necessary to preserve the public's confidence in a competent and ethical judiciary.1 3 Thus, judicial discipline serves
not only to protect the public by deterring misconduct, it also serves to preserve

6

Id. at 788-91 (0' Connor, J.,concurring).

7

Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J, concurring).

8

9

10
I
12

13

Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
In re Callanan, 355 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Mich. 1984).
In re Jenkins, 465 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Mich. 1991).
In re Loyd, 384 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Mich. 1986).
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the public's trust in government by informing
the judiciary and the public that
14
judicial misconduct will not be tolerated.
With the inception of judicial conduct organizations ("JCOs") in the
1960s, states devised an alternative to traditional methods of imposing discipline
on members of the judiciary for misconduct. Instead of the "all or nothing"
solution to the problem of judicial misconduct provided by impeachment and
other forms of removal from office, JCOs are empowered to investigate charges
of judicial misconduct and to impose or recommend a variety of sanctions, up to
and including removal. 15 At the federal level, the Judicial Improvements Acts
of 2002 (formerly the Judicial Councils and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 1980)16 provides a similar mechanism for investigating complaints from the
public concerning judicial misconduct, while limiting the ability to remove an
Article I judge from office.
Although the vast majority of complaints of judicial misconduct are
dismissed for lack of evidence of wrongdoing,' 7 and most of the sanctions imposed for misconduct are less severe than removal from office, 18 removal
through the JCO mechanism remains a viable option in most states. Since 1985,
over two hundred state court judges have been removed from office. 19 Much of
the focus to date has been on the threat to judicial independence that such sanctions pose. 20 However, in a country where the overwhelming majority of state
court judges are selected or retained on the basis of popular election, 2' the removal of a judge from office can pose an equal threat to the underlying goal of
popular elections -judicial accountability. Although there are various strains in
the concept of judicial accountability, the principal argument advanced by supporters of a popularly elected judiciary is that the public should have the right to
choose whom it wishes to serve as a judge.2 2 Hence, the removal of an elected

14

In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 715 (Or. 1998).

15

See infra notes 131-54 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C.A. § 351-364 (West Supp. 2003) (repealing Judicial Councils and Judicial Con-

16

duct and Disability Act of 1980 § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (2000)).
17
Mary Ellen Keith, JudicialDiscipline: Drawing the Line Between Confidentiality and Public Information, 41 S. Tx. L. REV. 1399, 1404-05 (2000).
18
See Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical
Process in JudicialReform, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 353, 386 (2000) (citing the fact that only two hundred state court judges were removed from office between 1985 and 1995).
19

Id.

20

See, e.g., Steven Lubet, JudicialDiscipline and Judicial Independence, LAW &

CONTEMP.

PROBS., Summer 1998, at 59.
21
Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S.
Tx. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (2000).
22
See infra notes 46-78 and accompanying text.
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judge from office potentially threatens to stand in opposition to the will of the
people.
JCOs do not necessarily have to stand in opposition to the principle of
judicial accountability, however. As this Article attempts to illustrate, in states
that employ popular election as the primary means of selecting judges, JCOs
and courts can serve as mechanisms for providing greater and more meaningful
accountability. As background, Part II describes the conflicting goals of the
judiciary: judicial independence and judicial accountability. As the focus of the
Article is on elective judiciaries, Part II also attempts to describe the different
conceptions of the meaning of "judicial accountability," while identifying the
most common arguments in favor of popular election. Part III describes the
various methods of imposing judicial discipline, paying particular attention to
JCOs at the state level. Part IV discusses how the disciplinary mechanisms of
JCOs square with the twin goals of judicial independence and judicial accountability, while paying particular attention to their effect in states that use popular
election as the principal means of selecting judges. Specifically, it focuses on
the features of removal mechanisms in some elective states that have the capacity to undermine the goal of judicial accountability. Finally, Part V suggests
several ways that JCOs and courts in elective states can help produce a more
informed electorate, thereby promoting the goal of judicial accountability that
popular elections seek to accomplish.
II. THE TWIN GOALS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY

A.

The Meanings of "JudicialIndependence" and "JudicialAccountability"

Judicial independence and judicial accountability are the twin goals of
the judiciary. Although the two concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
they represent competing visions of a judge's proper role in a democratic government. In many ways, a government's decision as to the method for selecting
its judges represents a value judgment as to how best to balance these competing
visions.
1.

Judicial Independence

Judicial independence is frequently referred to as one of the cornerstones of the legal system. 23 The term is usually described as the idea that
judges should decide cases based upon the facts and law of a case and their own
conscience, without fear of reprisal from other branches or the public at large. 24
23

See, e.g., JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHIcs 8 (2d ed. 1995).

24

See Lubet, supra note 20,at 67.
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As the United States Supreme Court stated in Bradley v. Fisher25 more than a
century ago, judicial independence is the principle that "a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his26 own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.,
For champions of judicial independence, any force that threatens to improperly influence a judge's decision-making is a threat to the system of democratic government. As Alexander Hamilton and James Madison envisioned, the
judiciary is positioned to serve as a check against the majoritarian forces of the
executive and legislative branches. 27 Therefore, as the defenders of minority
rights from the tyranny of the majority, it is imperative
that judges remain as
28
free as possible from the influences of the majority.
Threats to judicial independence may take many forms. For champions
of judicial independence, the most obvious threat comes from giving the
electorate a direct voice in the selection of judges. Innumerable critics have
decried the damaging influences that the popular election of judges has on judicial independence. The most common criticisms are that campaign contributions corrupt or at least give the appearance of corrupting the judiciary; 29 that
judges may be inclined to shy away from making controversial decisions for
fear of not being re-elected; 30 that popular elections produce less-qualified
25

80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335 (1871).

26

Id. at 347.

27

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at

470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing

that an independent judiciary is "an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humours in the society.").
28
See Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 694-97 (1995).
concur29
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
ring); Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and DemocraticAccountability in Highest State
Courts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 79, 91 ("Even when the amounts of [campaign contributions from litigants and lawyers] are relatively small, the contributions look a little
like bribes or shake-downs related to the outcomes of past or future lawsuits."); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The PoliticalEconomy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157,
161-62 (1999) (finding a pattern for jury verdicts against out-of-state corporations to be markedly
higher than against in-state corporations and that this pattern is more pronounced in states where
judges are chosen through partisan elections than in states where judges are not elected); Races
Divided in Opinion on Courts Survey: Blacks Have Less Confidence in Judiciary Than Whites,
Poll Finds. Most Believe Courts ProtectRights But Think Judges May Be Swayed by Politics,L.A.
TIMES, May 15, 1999, at All (reporting results from a 1999 survey by the National Center for
State Courts finding that 81% of those surveyed believed that judges' decisions are influenced by
political considerations and 78% agreed with the statement elected judges "are influenced by
having to raise campaign funds.").
30
See White, 536 U.S. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J.,concurring); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J.
Keenan, Judges and the Politicsof Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 759-60 (1995) (arguing that judicial independence is
threatened when judges must decide capital cases when faced with election campaigns); Gerald F.
Uelman, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintainingthe Independence of State Supreme Courts in an
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judges; 3' and that the electorate is simply unqualified to assess which candidate
would make the better judge.32
In short, the champions of judicial independence urge that judges be
kept as free as possible from the potentially damaging influence of the majority.
This is not to say that supporters of judicial independence believe that there
should be no controls over the judiciary or that judges should be completely
isolated from the public. There are clearly some cases, such as a corrupt or insane judge, that warrant the ability to remove or control judges.33 However,
champions of judicial independence believe that the potential for danger is great
when majoritarian forces have the power and ability to influence the decisionmaking of the countermajoritarian judiciary. As such, there need to be strict
limitations on potential threats to the decisional independence of judges.
Those who place a premium on judicial independence typically argue in
favor of methods of judicial selection that will, to the extent possible, insulate
the judiciary from the prevailing winds of the majority. Appointment by the
executive resulting in life tenure during good behavior is perhaps the most obvious example. 34 Recognizing that the electorate is unwilling to completely relinquish control over the judiciary, many states have instead adopted merit selection systems. Merit selection represents something of a compromise between
preserving the independence of the judiciary and allowing some form of control
by the electorate. The emphasis, however, is on independence.
First proposed by Albert M. Kales of the American Judicature Society
in 1913, merit selection involves the selection of a judge by the governor from a
list of candidates nominated by a commission consisting of appointed lawyers
Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133-35 (1997) (warning of the
threat to judicial independence when judges run in retention campaigns while having to decide
cases involving such contentious issues as the death penalty, abortion, and ballot measures).
31

See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 503 (1998) ("As practicing lawyers know, in

aggregate, state court judges are just not as good as federal court judges."); Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity,90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
32

See Daniel Burke, Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7b(l)(C): Toward the Proper Regula-

tion of Speech in Judicial Campaigns, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 181, 205-06 (1993) ("One of the
most significant problems with judicial elections is that of an uninformed electorate. A great
percentage of the voting public does not know who they vote for, why they vote for them, and
what role the different levels of judges play."); Roger Handberg, Judicial Accountability and
Independence: Balancing Incompatibles?,49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 132 (1994) ("[Wle, the public, are largely unaware of who our local judges are and how well they are performing their duties.").
See David P. Currie, Separating JudicialPower, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998,
at 7, 10, 11; see also Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal
Judicial Service - and Disservice - 1789-1992, U. PA. L. REV. 333, 334 (1993) ("[J]udicial
independence was probably not intended to trump judicial accountability for misbehavior.").
33

34 See Lubet, supra note 20, at 59 (arguing that "even the most concerted political or editorial
attack on a federal judge cannot truly threaten the judge's independence" given the judge's life
tenure during good behavior).
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and non-lawyers. 35 Once appointed, the judge stands for continuation in office
in a non-competitive retention election in which the judge must receive a certain
percentage of votes in order to remain in office.36 Proponents of merit selection
argue that the system effectively preserves judicial independence by removing
some of the corrupting influences of political campaigns. Although the voters in
merit selection states still theoretically retain control over who sits on the bench,
proponents argue that the non-competitive, "straight up or down" nature of retention elections helps divorce judges from the damaging influences of politics. 3 7 However, the use of such retention elections is seen by champions of
judicial independence as harmful to a judge's independence because special
interests may mobilize during a retention election to defeat a judge for his or her
decisions on the bench.3 8
2.

Judicial Accountability

For champions of judicial accountability, politics can never be removed
from the selection process, nor should it be. Central to the idea of judicial accountability is the concept of a connection between the populace and the judiciary. Arguments in favor of judicial accountability take two forms, one weak
and one strong.
Proponents of the weak conception of judicial accountability use the
term to describe the idea that the people must remain connected to the judiciary
in the general sense and that judges must remain connected to the rule of law.
As the judiciary is a co-equal branch of government, the electorate has a right
and an interest in having knowledge of, and access to, the workings of the judiciary. As such, it is essential that judges not become too isolated from the concerns of the people whom the laws were made to protect. As John P. Sahl puts
it, "[a] judiciary that is too separate from the democratic order may interfere
with democratic commitments to majority rule., 39 Along those same lines, even
strong proponents of judicial independence acknowledge the need to maintain
some checks on judicial behavior. The continued vitality of the judiciary depends in no small measure on the public's confidence that judges are ethical and

35

John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 837, 843-44

(1990).
36

Id.

37

Id. at 856-57.
See generally Maute, supra note 21, at 1218 (citing, as an example, Justice Penny White of

38

Tennessee who was defeated by special interest groups opposed to her vote on a death penalty
case).
39
See John P. Sahl, Secret Discipline in the Federal Courts - Democratic Values and Judicial Integrity at Stake, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 193, 249 (1994) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
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that justice is being dispensed fairly and impartially. 40 Thus, there must be some
way of keeping the reins on "runaway judges" or "lawless judges who exceed
their authority.'
Therefore, the weak conception of judicial accountability
recognizes that "Uludicial independence is not an absolute value" 2 and that
some connection between the public and the judiciary is necessary to prevent the
perception that the judiciary is an untouchable cabal deciding cases on the flip
of a coin.4 3 To a certain extent, this weak conception of accountability means
that, to justify the independence granted to them, judges must demonstrate their
accountability to the rule of the law. an
In contrast, the strong conception of judicial accountability does not
limit itself to mere connectedness in the general sense between the judiciary and
the people. Instead, for proponents of the strong conception of judicial accountability, true accountability involves the people having a direct voice in who dispenses justice. Whereas the idea of judicial independence stresses independence
from popular repercussions in judicial decision-making, the strong conception of
judicial accountability proffered by Philip L. Dubois and others stresses the notion that it is perfectly proper for judges to feel such repercussions for their decisions. 45 And the best means of making judges feel those effects is through
popular election.
Arguments in favor of popular election take two main forms. First,
supporters of an elective judiciary view the role of judges in a somewhat different fashion than in the traditional sense. The classical conception of a judge's
role is that of a non-political actor. Under this conception, judges are "legal
technicians," applying the law in a neutral fashion and exercising little discretion.46 In short, judges are legal experts, and they perform a function entirely
different than that of other elected officials. Proponents of the strong view of
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction.").

40

41
42

Currie, supra note 33, at 11, 14.
Sahl, supra note 39, at 230.

See generally Van Tassell, supra note 33, at 334 ("[W]e value holding judges accountable
for behavior deviating from high standards of probity in order to ensure, among other things,
public confidence in the judiciary .... ").
44
See Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardianof JudicialIndependence, 72
S. CAL. L. REv. 625, 644 (1999); see also Carrington, supra note 29, at 80 ("[C]ourts, to merit
their independence, must be faithful to democratic law; they must obey the law as made by legislative bodies or set forth in reasonably explicit provisions of constitutions ratified by a democratic
process.").
45
Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The Role
of PopularJudicialElections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 38 (1986) (special edition).
46
Ptnup L. DUBOls, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 22-23 (1980) (describing the classical view of
the role of a judge).
43
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judicial accountability largely reject this conception of the judicial role. For
supporters of the strong conception of accountability, judges are invested with
considerable discretion in their decisions and are more active in the policymaking process than proponents of the classical view of judging acknowledge. Like
members of the other two branches, judges are, in effect, policymakers and
hence political actors.47 Like other policy makers, judges allocate values in their
decisions. 48 Although recognizing a distinction between the role of a judge and
the role of legislators and executives, this conception of the judicial role emphasizes that "judges frequently are able to develop common law, to interpret statutes and administrative regulations, and to adjudicate constitutional disputes all opportunities which allow judges explicitly to veto, legitimize, or reinforce
public policies. '49
Thus, because of their impact on public policy, not only should judges
be "connected" to the electorate by being "sensitive and responsive to the political, economic, social, moral and ethical views held by a majority of citizens,"
they should be held accountable for their responsiveness (or lack thereof) by
being made to stand for election. 50 In order to ensure this responsiveness, regular and periodic elections are essential; otherwise, "the public's real ability effectively to revise or reverse disfavored policies by replacing those who promulgated them" would be thwarted.5 1
The second argument in favor of popular election is really a response to
a criticism of electing judges. One of the main criticisms of popular election of
judges is that elections simply do not provide a mechanism for ensuring the
popular control over the judiciary that supporters argue is essential. 52 Critics of
popular election charge that voter disinterest, the lack of any real discussion
between candidates as to substantive issues, and the fact that incumbents often

47

Id. at 23; David Adamany & Philip Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 731,

768.
48

Dubois, supra note 45, at 38.

DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 24. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 784 (2002) ("Not only do state-court judges possess the power to 'make' common law, but
they have the immense power to shape the States' constitutions as well.").
50
Dubois, supra note 45, at 34; see also Adamany & Dubois, supra note 47, at 768; Ray M.
49

Harding, The Casefor PartisanElection of Judges, 55 A.B.A. J. 1162, 1163 (1969) ("Because of
the great authority vested in judges it must be accepted as a fact that they formulate public policy.
It seems logical, therefore, that judicially determined political policies should and must conform to
the will of the people."). See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 CoLUM. L. REV. 531, 533-35 (1998) (defining accountability as the requirement that
public officials stand periodically for election, but arguing that "accountability is best understood,
not as a utilitarian means to achieve maximum satisfaction of popular preferences, but as a structural feature of the constitutional architecture, the goal of which is to protect liberty.").
51
Adamany & Dubois, supra note 47, at 768.
52

DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 28 (noting this criticism).
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run unopposed prevent voters from exercising any control over policy. 53 As
such, elections are incapable of producing any real judicial accountability. 54
This is particularly true of non-partisan elections, in which voters are denied
even the cue that a party label might provide in making their selections.55
Supporters of popular election typically respond in one of two ways.
Some, such as Dubois, contend that such arguments are based on incomplete
information and/or an outdated and unrealistic view of the purpose of elections.
Dubois generally concedes that voters are not competent to choose between
judges on the basis of specific qualifications or policy stands.56 However, the
same argument applies with equal force to any elected official. 57 Instead, elections are beneficial for other reasons, including the legitimacy they provide.58
For Dubois, "elections should not be evaluated in terms of their role in permitting the citizenry to directly control public policy .... , Instead, voters influence policy in more indirect ways. At the front end, voters attempt to shape
policy by selecting candidates whom they believe share their fundamental interests and values. 6° As such, they look for cues that may reflect such beliefs. In
the case of partisan elections, a judge's identification of political party is a fairly
reliable indicator of a particular belief structure. 61 In the case of non-partisan
elections, voters look for other cues, such as endorsements. 62 For Dubois, partisan elections are preferable because "party labels identify, in a general way, the
kinds of policies voters can expect from individual judges on the bench wearing
each label. 63 Therefore, party labels can provide a means for genuine accountability by providing a mechanism that allows voters to affix responsibility for
the general direction of policy once an official is in power.64 Once a judge is in

53

Id. at 32-33.

5

Id.

55

Adamany & Dubois, supra note 47, at 775; Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of
Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 26 (1995).
56
DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 30, 35.
Dubois, supra note 45, at 41; see also DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 30 ("Elections should not
be evaluated in terms of their role in permitting the citizenry to directly control public policy,
something they are neither equipped nor disposed to do.").
58
See DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 30.
57

59
60

Id.
Dubois, supra note 45, at 41.

61

Adamany & Dubois, supra note 47, at 776; Dubois, supra note 45, at 44.

62

Dubois, supra note 45, at 45.

63

DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 35.

64

Id. at96.
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office, voters can shape policy by rewarding or punishing the judge for the decisions the judge has made.6 5
Other proponents of the strong conception of judicial accountability eschew the reliance on party labels and instead simply argue that the electorate is
as qualified to select judges as it is to select members of the executive and legislative branches. For example, on the subject of popular election of judges, a
justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has stated:
The "merit-selection" arguments against popular judicial elections in essence ask: what does a dishwasher know of judging?
But one might as well ask, what does a dishwasher know of
governmental budgeting, or of foreign policy? Perhaps not
much. Yet it is the key to our system that we entrust the selection of key public officials to our citizenry in general, rather
than 6to elites with purportedly superior knowledge and train6
ing.

Even though voters may lack knowledge about specific policy or legal issues,
some supporters of popular election argue that voters are just as capable of assessing a candidate's record for such qualities as "honesty and integrity, competence and ability, intelligence and industriousness, and most importantly, fairness and judicial temperament" as they are those attributes in legislative and
executive candidates.67
No matter what their justifications, supporters of the strong conception
of judicial accountability are ultimately forced to confront the argument of opponents that popular election produces a less-qualified judiciary. 68 Supporters
of popular election typically respond with research suggesting that methods of
judicial selection make very little difference in terms of the quality of the bench.
Addressing the charge that an elective system is unlikely to attract qualified
candidates, some have concluded that there is little evidence to support the argument that qualified lawyers are any more reluctant to run for judgeship in a
partisan election than they are to submit their names in appointive systems or to
be considered for a merit plan nomination. 69 Indeed, supporters of popular election sometimes point to the fact that several studies have found little, if any,
appreciable difference in the quality of the judiciary in elective versus appointive states. 7 0 Therefore, if popular election of judges produces the same quality
65

Id.

66

Larry V. Starcher, Choosing West Virginia's Judges, W. VA.

67

Tyrie A. Boyer, Erosionof Democracy, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 139, 140 (1994).

68

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

69

See CHARLES

70

See DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 17 ("It is exceedingly difficult if not impossible... to verify

LAW., Oct.

1998, at 20.

H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE 71 (1997).
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in the judiciary as does merit selection or appointment, and if judges are deciding matters of vital public policy from the bench, popular election is entirely
defensible in the eyes of supporters. Dubois goes a step further, arguing that
even if it is admitted that partisan elections do not produce a judiciary of the
same quality as other methods, "it may just be a sacrifice that must be offered in
exchange for the achievement of institutional accountability. 7 1
For proponents of the strong conception of judicial accountability, objections to popular election of judges also have an element of elitism to them.
Unlike with merit selection, where nominating committees "must insist that
every candidate be 'squeaky clean' in order to avoid any embarrassment to
themselves or to the Governor," with popular elections, voters are able to make
a more reasoned selection by looking at the entire record of a judicial candidate. 72 For supporters of popular election, voters are perfectly capable of deciding whether "to forgive small transgressions" or whether a candidate's past ethical breaches disqualify that candidate from judicial office and do not need the
paternalism of appointed nominating commissions. 73
Another objection to merit selection made by supporters of the strong
conception is that the method by which the nominating commissions are appointed is inherently political and subject to influence by the legislature, the
governor, or the bar.74 As a result, the nominating process can just as easily be
the result of a backroom swap, a kowtowing to the wishes of the governor, or an
attempt to foist a particular candidate upon the governor as it is a nomination
or refute the assertion that the merit plan improves the quality of the bench."); Henry R. Glick &
Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics:The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228, 235 (1987) ("[W]e find that selection systems have no
important impact on selecting judges with different or superior credentials for office ....
);
Melinda Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427,
428 (1992) ("Empirical research on the effects of judicial selection processes has been quite consistent in finding that methods of judicial recruitment does not affect either the quality of the
bench or judicial outcomes."), quoted in SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 69, at 73; John M. Scheb,
II, State Appellate Judges' Attitudes Toward JudicialMerit Selection and Retention: Results of a
National Survey, 72 JUDICATURE 170, 170-71 n.8 (1988) (concluding that there is little evidence
that selection systems produce judges with superior judicial credentials). See generally DANIEL R.
PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION

METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY:

INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY 135 (1995) (concluding that "the decisions from the legis-

latively selected benches are laconic, prosaic, and sterile."); Starcher, supra note 66, at 18 (arguing in favor of elective systems and citing some of the authorities above).
71
DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 249.
72

Boyer, supra note 67, at 142.

73

Id.

Luke Bierman, Preserving Power in Picking Judges: Merit Selection for the New York
Court of Appeals, 60 ALB. L. REV. 339, 357 (1996) ("The adoption of merit selection for the New
York Court of Appeals can be attributed to the political leadership and organized bar seeking to
maintain their longstanding influence in selecting judges when confronted with losing that role
because of independent popular impulses in an electoral system."); Maute, supra note 21, at 1235.
74
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truly based on merit.75 As the members of nominating commissions are appointed, the accountability of judges to the electorate is further weakened.76
Furthermore, proponents of the strong view argue that although merit selection
pays lip service to the notion of judicial accountability, in reality there is little
accountability, as there is little need for a sitting judge to explain and defend his
policies since there is no opponent in retention elections.7 7
In short, for advocates of the strong conception of accountability, no
matter what method of selection is used, the selection of judges is inherently a
78
politics
of few.
who sits on the
process.
judgesofare
makers,
political
be theAs
politics
the policy
electorate
ratherthe
than
a select
bench should
B.

And the Winner Is?

The arguments for and against each selection method have been repeated ad nauseam in academic literature. Supporters of each position are effectively able to undercut the other side's position to the point where one is left
with the uneasy conclusion that each selection method is equally flawed or, at
best, that one is only slightly less satisfactory than the others. 79 Critics of popular election argue that there is no true accountability in judicial elections because
80
voter turnout is low and the voters who vote do so with little information.
Critics of appointive systems or merit selection charge that such systems are
elitist and deny voters a say in vitally important matters. 81 Indeed, the issue in
DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 11; Maute, supra note 21, at 1235. See generally Starcher, supra
note 66, at 19 ("I disfavor a politics that gives the choice of judges to a select few, behind closed
doors.").
76
See Boyer, supra note 67, at 144.
75

Adamany & Dubois, supra note 47, at 769; see also Duois, supra note 46, at 18 ("Without
a self-interested challenger to bring to light the professional failings of a sitting judge, re-election
is virtually assured.").
78
See LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POUCY 128-30 (3d ed. 1994)
(arguing that merit selection of judges has not removed politics from the process of selecting
judges); Dorothy W. Nelson, Variations on a Theme - Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S.
CAL. L. REV. 4, 32-33 (1962) (arguing that the process of allowing a governor to appoint judges is
a political process); Webster, supra note 55, at 3 n.9 ("The process of picking a person to be a
judge is woven into the political fabric and is, by any definition, a political process.") (quoting
Daniel J. Meador, Some Yins and Yangs of Our JudicialSystem, 66 A.B.A. J. 122, 122 (1980)).
77

See generally Carrington, supra note 29, at 114 ("The best of the various unsatisfactory
ways of selecting high court judges is probably that prescribed in the Constitution of the United
States."); Maute, supra note 21, at 1198-2001 (describing criticisms of the various methods and
stating the author's opinion that she is "adamantly ambivalent" about merit selection).
80
See, e.g., Maute, supra note 21, at 1205.
79

81

See Dubois, supra note 45, at 32. See generally Carrington, supra note 29, at 107 ("[T]he

people are rightly reluctant to confer on a professional elite the responsibility for deciding such
questions as whether there is a right to live or a right to die.").
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illustrates the dilemma that each state
faces in choosing a particular method of judicial selection: how best to balance
83
the competing goals of judicial independence and judicial accountability.
Thankfully, it is not the purpose of this Article to declare once and for
all which selection method is the best and whether states should value judicial
independence or accountability more highly. Instead, for background purposes,
it seems wise to simply say that on a practical level there is no clear-cut "winner" in the debate over judicial independence versus judicial accountability. On
the federal level, the Constitution clearly places the premium on judicial independence. The life tenure granted to Article III judges during good behavior
clearly reflects a desire to insulate judges from popular sentiments. The state
level is fairly evenly divided. Over thirty states use popular elections to select
some or all of their appellate and/or general jurisdiction trial court judges. 84 Of
these, somewhere around twenty-one states use partisan or non-partisan elections as the principal means of selecting their judges, a handful allow the governor or legislature to appoint judges, and the rest employ merit selection at least
on some levels.85 According to one estimate, approximately 87% of state court
judges are selected or retained on the basis of popular election, but 80% of all
86
judicial offices are initially filled by appointment to complete unexpired terms.
Despite the fairly even split at the state level between appointment and
election, there is general agreement among legal academics who have written on
the subject of judicial selection that popular election is, on the whole, a poor
method of selecting judges. Although writers have not hesitated to note the
shortcomings of all of the methods of judicial selection, popular election is typically singled out for particular criticism. 87 In addition to the numerous arguments against popular election mentioned above, 88 the most relevant for purposes of this Article is the argument that popular election produces more ethiRepublican Party of Minnesota v. White

82

536 U.S. 765 (2002).

83

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

84

See White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing AMERICAN JUDICATURE

SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS

(2002)); Roy A. Schotand, 2002 Judicial Elections and State Court Reforms, in THE BOOK OF
STATES 2003, at 233, 235 (2003).
85
Maute, supra note 21, at 1202-10. Given the fact that some states employ different methods
for selecting appellate judges and general jurisdiction judges, it is difficult to assign an exact figure on the number of states that primarily employ partisan or non-partisan selection. For purposes
of this Article, the following states are classified as states that use elections as the principal means
of judicial selection: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
86
Id. at 1203.
87

See Schotland, supra note 1, at 150.

88

See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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cally challenged judges than do other selection methods. 89 Although supporters
of popular election point to studies purportedly demonstrating no discernible
difference in the quality of appointed versus elected judiciaries and argue that
competitive elections provide a method for removing "despotic, lazy, incompetent, or dishonest judges," 9 the majority of academics continue to disagree.
Some have argued that the electoral process, on the whole, has not been an effective method of judicial discipline because voters are more likely to vote out
judges for unpopular decisions than for ethical infractions. 9' Even when opponents of popular election do not specifically raise ethical concerns, they assert
that popular election is not as effective as other forms of judicial selection at
screening out unqualified candidates.9 2
Despite the numerous objections to elective judiciaries, it seems safe to
conclude that they will remain a reality in many states for the foreseeable future.
Convincing voters that the initial selection of judges should be placed in the
hands of the governor or an appointed commission instead of the people is a
tough sell. In attempting to bring about change to an elective system, supporters
of merit selection or appointment are ultimately forced to confront the arguments of those in favor of popular election that the people's right to vote will be
taken away and placed in the hands of an elite.93 As such, many in power are
reluctant to lend their names to a cause that faces the struggle of convincing the
voters to relinquish their power to select judges. Because elected judges will
probably remain a fixture in the states for the foreseeable future, commentators
must devote attention to ensuring that elective judiciaries remain at least as ethical on the whole as their appointive counterparts.

See MAx BOOT, OUT OF ORDER 196-97 (1998) (detailing examples of judicial misconduct
and adding that "[i]t's no coincidence that virtually all the examples of misconduct in this chapter
involve states that pick their judges through partisan election."); Maute, supra note 21, at 1226
(noting the claim of those in favor of merit selection that "discipline for judicial misconduct almost invariably involves elected, not appointed judges.").
Boyer, supra note 67, at 143.
90
89

Randy J.Holland & Cynthia Gray, JudicialDiscipline: Independence with Accountability, 5
125 (2000); Sambhau N. Sankar, Comment, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1251 (2000).
92
See, e.g., Maute, supra note 21, at 1237 ("[M]erit selection clearly does a better job than
91

WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 117,

").
elections at eliminating unqualified candidates ....
See Carrington, supra note 29, at 106; see also John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, Strike
One, Strike Two: The History of and Prospectfor JudicialReform in Ohio, 75 JUDICATURE 193,
199 (1992) (detailing the defeat of Ohio's proposed switch to merit selection in 1987 and attributing much of the defeat to the arguments of opponents that the people's "right to vote" would be
taken away through merit selection).

93
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III. JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES

A.

TraditionalMethods of JudicialDisciplineand Removal

Historically, institutionalized options for disciplining judges were limited. Judges have always faced various forms of informal pressure on their behavior, such as the appellate process, informal collegial pressures, and the fear
of criminal prosecution. However, traditionally there have been only a handful
of formal institutions and procedures designed specifically to regulate the conduct of judges.94 By the second half of the twentieth century, however, federal
and state governments began experimenting with ways to provide for greater
variety in the discipline of judges.
1.

Judicial Discipline at the Federal Level

Reflecting their strong views on the value of judicial independence, the
framers of the United States Constitution provided for only one explicit method
of disciplining federal judges - impeachment.95 Impeachment is, by design, a
cumbersome and time-consuming process.96 As such, it has generally only been
employed in cases of egregious judicial misconduct. Only thirteen federal
judges have been impeached by the House of Representatives in the nation's
history, and only seven of those were convicted by the Senate.9 7 Five of these
convictions came in the twentieth century, and the judges in each instance were
charged with offenses that, if committed, would have constituted crimes.9 8
One of the shortcomings of impeachment is that it provides for an "allor-nothing" solution to the problem of judicial misconduct. 99 In an effort to
provide for less severe forms of judicial discipline than removal from office,
Congress passed the Judicial Councils and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
of 1980.00 In 2002, the portion of the Judicial Councils and Judicial Conduct
and Disability Act of 1980 dealing with judicial misconduct was repealed and
recodified as amended by the Judicial Improvements Act of 2002.10' The sub94

Sahl, supra note 39, at 208.

95

U.S. CONST. art. II,

97

MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT 1 (1993).

98

Grimes, supra note 96, at 1214-15.

99

See MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 6 cmt. (1994); MARVIN

§ 4.
96
Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment as the Exclusive
Removal Mechanismfor FederalJudges, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1209, 1210 (1991).

COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY -

SELECTION, COMPENSATION, ETHICS AND

DISCIPLINE 206 (1987).

100 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 372, 604 (2000)).
101

28 U.S.C.A. § 351-364 (West Supp. 2003) (repealing Judicial Councils and Judicial Con-

duct and Disability Act of 1980 § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (2000)).
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stance of the two acts is largely the same. Under the Judicial Improvements Act
of 2002, any person may file a complaint against an Article III judge who has
allegedly engaged in "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or... [who] is unable to0 2discharge all
the duties of the office by reason of physical or mental disability."'
Upon receiving a complaint, the chief judge of the judicial circuit reviews the complaint and decides whether to dismiss out of hand or refer the
complaint to a judicial committee for investigation.10 3 After the committee conducts its investigation, it files a report with the judicial council of the circuit,
which may urge voluntary retirement, order that no new cases be assigned to the
judge on a temporary basis, or privately or publicly censure the judge if warranted.1°4 If the council finds that the judge might have engaged in conduct that
would be grounds for impeachment, it can refer the matter to the Judicial Conference of the United States, which has the authority to certify to the House of
Representatives that impeachment may be warranted. 05 Notably, however, the
Act specifically provides that "in no circumstances may the council order removal
106 from office of any judge appointed to hold office during good behavior.",
Despite the legislative history of the Judicial Councils and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act, which indicates that Congress was primarily concerned about improving judicial accountability and supplementing the impeachment process, 1°7 the history of the judicial councils regarding disciplinary
action against judges has largely been one of inaction. 10 8 One author has concluded that the fact that the vast majority of complaints are dismissed "raises
serious questions about judges' willingness to judge other judges." 1°9 Others
have attacked the highly restrictive confidentiality requirements of the Act." 0
John P. Sahl argues that the Act's "broad shroud of secrecy," ostensibly designed to preserve judicial independence by shielding judges from public complaints that may damage their reputation, promotes judicial independence to the
exclusion of promoting judicial accountability."' Sahl argues that in their pre102

Id. § 351(a).

103

Id. § 353(a)(1).

104

Id. §§ 353(c), 354(a)(2).

105

Id. §§ 354(b)(2), 355(b)(1).
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Id. § 354(a)(3)(A).

107

Sahl, supra note 39, at 211.
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Carol T. Rieger, The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act:
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EMORY

'09

Id. at 94.
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See Sahl, supra note 39, at 246.
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sent form, the confidentiality requirements damage the
public's perceptionn of
the judiciary from the public."
judicial self-regulation and further isolate
2.

Judicial Discipline at the State Level

Virtually all states provide for the removal of judges through the impeachment process 1 3 The same problems that plague impeachment at the federal level apply to the states as well. The time-consuming nature of the process
and the possibility of political intrigue make impeachment appropriate only in
the most egregious cases of judicial misconduct. 114 Indeed, the drawbacks of
impeachment may be even more pronounced at the state level than at the federal
level. Most state legislatures convene for only several months out of the year.
The impeachment process, including the trial phase, effectively forces a legislature to shut down all other business and devote all of its time and energy to the
matter of impeachment.1 5 Already pressed for time, state legislatures are forced
to cease their policymaking duties and invest considerable time in impeachment
proceedings, all for the task of deciding whether to remove one judge from office.
In addition, in some states, grounds for impeachment are limited to conduct connoting illegality.' 16 Thus, the impeachment process has been criticized
for not reaching conduct that is legal but is "nevertheless indicative of unfitness
to hold judicial office."' "7 Not surprisingly, like at 18
the federal level, impeachment at the state level is a relatively rare occurrence.
Although at various times throughout the nation's development the individual states have had disciplinary options in addition to impeachment, these
other options contained many of the same shortcomings. Address is a method of
removal by which a state legislature makes a formal request to the governor that
a judge be removed from office even though the judge's conduct may not rise to
the level of an impeachable offense. 1 9 Although address provides for no formal
112

Id. at 246-49.
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Holland & Gray, supra note 91, at 121.

114

SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 26.

15 See COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 99, at 206. See generally VOLCANSEK, supra note
97, at 4 (noting that impeachment of judges in the states "has been a failure 'in all but the most
egregious cases,' largely because it encroaches on the legislative agenda."); Grimes, supra note
96, at 1225-27 (discussing the time-consuming and expensive nature of impeachment trials at the
federal level).
116

COMISKY & PATrERSON, supra note 99, at 206.
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See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Turco, 970 P.2d 731, 737 (Wash. 1999) ("No

Washington judge has ever been impeached or removed by the legislature.").
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Edward J. Schoenbaum, A HistoricalLook at JudicialDiscipline, 54 Cm-KENT L. REv. 1, 4

(1977).
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methods of investigating misconduct, a judge is entitled to notice and has a right
to be heard. 12 Address was authorized as a means of removing judges in
twenty-eight states by 1922,121 but by 1982, the number had dropped to nine123
teen. 22 Today, the process of address is rarely utilized where it still exists.
Historically, voters could also remove judges through the process of recall.
Through this process, the submission of a petition signed by a required percentage of registered voters triggers a recall vote. 12 4 Historically, recall was a cumbersome procedure that was only used in the most flagrant cases of judicial misconduct. 125 In addition, recall has been criticized as a means of discipline because, although voters are able to express their desires as to a judge's continued
tenure in office, there is no hearing and formal adjudication of charges of misconduct. 126 In short, the procedures of address and recall contain many of the
same disadvantages as impeachment and have been used sparingly. 127 Like impeachment, where the procedures of address and recall still exist, they exist
mainly as a theoretical basis for the removal of state judges (California's recent
experiment in the gubernatorial context notwithstanding).
Another method of discipline is the election process itself. Although
typically thought of as a way for voters to express their displeasure with the
policies promulgated by an elected official, elections can also serve as a way for
voters to express their disapproval of an official's behavior in office. Thus, voting can be a form of discipline in its own right. 28 Several factors make elections inefficient as the primary means of discipline. First, if the opponents and
even some supporters of popular election are correct, voters do not routinely
29
base their decisions in judicial elections on specific pieces of information.
As such, some have suggested that the disciplinary function of elections is limited because judges are rarely voted out of office for ethical infractions., 3" Another factor undercutting the ability of popular election to serve as an effective
disciplinary mechanism is the fact that most elections only take place once every
120

Id.

121

Id.

122

VOLCANSEK, supra note 97, at 4.

123

Holland & Gray, supra note 91, at 122; Schoenbaum, supra note 119, at 4-5.
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Schoenbaum, supra note 119, at 8.
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Id.
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COMISKY & PATrERSON, supra note 99, at 209.
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SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 6.
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See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Turco, 970 P.2d 731, 740 (Wash. 1999) ("The

ultimate discipline, if any, for [off the bench misconduct] would emerge at the next election.").
129
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., COMISKY & PATrERSON, supra note 99, at 151; Holland & Gray, supra note 91, at
125; Sankar, supra note 91, at 1251.
130
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few years. Although voters may theoretically be able to remove a corrupt or
unethical judge when the judge stands for re-election, citizens are at the mercy
of a corrupt or lawless judge up until the time the judge is forced to stand for reelection. Therefore, elections cannot serve as a way of disciplining lawless
judges in the interim period between election and re-election.
B.

Judicial Conduct Organizations

Recognizing the drawbacks of these disciplinary methods, several states
began looking for alternatives that would allow them to discipline judges without necessarily having to remove them from office. In 1960, California created
131
the first permanent state commission charged with regulating judicial conduct.
By 1981, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had such organizations in
place.1 32 These state judicial conduct organizations are charged with investigating, filing, and prosecuting complaints about judicial misconduct and, in the
majority of states, recommending sanctions to the state's highest court or imposing such sanctions themselves. 133 Such organizations typically consist of a mixture of judges, lawyers, and non-lawyers.134 In most states, the judicial members
are chosen by other members of the judiciary, the non-lawyers are chosen by the
governor, and the lawyers are chosen by a35variety of selectors, including the
governor, the legislature, and the judiciary. 1
One feature that distinguishes judicial conduct organizations from other
methods of judicial discipline is the recognition that not every instance of judicial misconduct merits removal from office. The primary function of a state
JCO is to enforce that state's code of judicial conduct.' 36 The ABA's Code of
Judicial Conduct recognizes a wide variety of judicial misbehavior. As such,
states employ a plethora of phrases to describe the possible bases for action by
JCOs. Some of the most common grounds are "willful misconduct in office,"
"willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties," "conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute," and
"violation of the applicable code of judicial conduct" or "canons of judicial conduct."' 137 Canon 2A of the ABA's Code of Judicial Conduct is sweeping in its
131

SHAMAN ET AL., supra note
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COMISKY & PATERSON, supra note 99, at 165. Other grounds include "habitual intemperance," "conviction of a felony" or other crime that calls into question a judge's fitness for judicial
office, "disability that seriously interferes with" the performance of duties, incompetence, and
corruption in office. Id.at 165-74; Holland & Gray, supra note 91, at 125.
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scope: "A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times
in a manner that promotes confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.' 3 8 Therefore, JCOs are empowered to discipline judges for misbehavior on the bench and related to the judge's duties, and for misbehavior off
the bench unrelated to the judge's duties.
As judicial misconduct may take many forms, not all of which necessitate removal from office, most JCOs have a variety of sanctions at their disposal
short of removal. Depending on the individual state, most state JCOs are empowered to impose or recommend a variety of sanctions, including private admonition, reprimand, or censure; public reprimand or censure; suspension; the
assessment of costs or fines; and the imposition of limitations or conditions
upon the judicial office.' 39 Nearly all JCOs are also empowered to remove a
judge from office or recommend removal. 140
The jurisdiction of state judicial conduct organizations extends to judges
of general trial courts, intermediate and appellate courts, and state supreme
courts.' 4' All state JCOs are authorized to investigate complaints concerning
judicial misconduct and most possess extensive investigatory power, including
broad subpoena power. 142 If the investigation reveals some basis for believing
misconduct has occurred (typically upon a finding of probable cause), 143 the
panel may file and prosecute formal charges. 44
The majority of states employ a "one-tier" system, in which the JCO
holds hearings, makes findings of fact, and either imposes sanctions or recomIn most one-tier states, the
mends sanctions to the state's highest court.'
state's highest court is responsible for the final disposition of cases and has de
novo review powers." 46 In multi-tier states, investigative and adjudicative functions of the JCO are bifurcated. 147 After a panel investigates a complaint and
files and prosecutes formal changes, a special select panel or special court adjudicates the formal charges. 148 In some of the multi-tier states, the sanction deci138

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 2A (1990) (emphasis added).

139 Holland & Gray, supra note 91, at 132; Shaman, supra note 133, at 814.
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Holland & Gray, supra note 91, at 132; Shaman, supra note 133, at 814.
Shaman, supra note 133, at 814.

142

Id. at 814-15.
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143 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.85(5) (West 2002).
4

Id.

145

Shaman, supra note 133, at 811-12.

146

Id.

147 Two-tier states include Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, West

Virginia, and Wisconsin. Holland & Gray, supra note 91, at 128 n.80.
148
Shaman, supra note 133, at 812.

2003]

"STOP ME BEFORE I VOTE FOR THIS JUDGEAGAIN"

sion of the select panel or special court is reviewable by the
state's highest
49
court, whereas in others, the decision is not subject to review.,
There is considerable variation among the states as to the level of confidentiality involved in JCO proceedings. Investigatory proceedings are confidential in all states. 150 However, in a majority of states, complaints concerning judicial misconduct become public upon a finding by the JCO that there is indicia
of misconduct warranting a formal hearing.' 51 Generally, at that point, the public may obtain access to at least some of the records associated with the complaint and may attend the formal hearing. 152 In a slightly smaller number of
states, proceedings become public after the conclusion of a formal hearing and
after the JCO has recommended disciplinary action.1 53 In a few states, confiden54
tiality provisions remain in place until after sanctions are actually imposed.1
IV. How JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS SQUARE WITH NOTIONS OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The creation of the Judicial Councils and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act at the federal level and JCOs at the state level was seen as an attempt to
promote greater judicial accountability. 55 Not surprisingly, there has been concern in some quarters that their existence can improperly threaten judicial independence.156 In states that select their judges through popular election, JCOs
pose an additional theoretical threat: a threat to judicial accountability. Paradoxically, by attempting to improve accountability by creating entities with the
power to discipline judges by removing them from office, states have empowered JCOs to potentially undo the will of the electorate.

149

COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 99, at 153.

150

Holland & Gray, supra note 91, at 129.

151

Keith, supra note 17, at 1404; Bryan E. Keyt, Reconciling the Need for Confidentiality in

Judicial DisciplinaryProceedings with the First Amendment, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 959, 961
(1994).
152 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-377(a) (2002) (providing that notice, complaint, answer,
and other pleadings are not confidential upon a finding that formal proceedings should be instituted and that formal hearings are public).
153 Keyt, supra note 151, at 962.
154

Id.

155

See Lubet, supranote 20, at 60; supra note 107 and accompanying text.

156

See Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of JudicialIndependence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 700

(1980).
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Effect of JCOs in Appointive and Merit Selection States

At the federal level and in states that employ an appointive or merit selection system to select their judges, the goal of judicial independence takes
precedent over the goal of judicial accountability. Although appointed judges
certainly have fewer ties to the public than do judges in merit selection states,
because retention elections are non-competitive and incumbent judges are rarely
defeated (at least where the judge has not incurred the wrath of a particular interest group), accountability to the electorate is still fairly low in merit selection
states.157 Therefore, the creation of JCOs can be seen as a way of increasing
accountability while attempting to preserve a judge's independence.
1.

The Effect on Judicial Independence

At the federal level, the judicial disciplinary mechanism poses only a
limited direct threat to judicial independence because Article Ill judges enjoy
life tenure and may only be removed through the impeachment process.158 Admittedly, federal judges may still face the specter of public censure or temporary
suspension, and these forms of discipline have the potential to impact a judge's
decisional independence much in the same way as public calls for impeachment
or resignation by elected officials.15 9 However, although federal judges who
hold office during good behavior may suffer the embarrassment of a public censure at the hands of a judicial council, unless they have committed an impeachable offense, they can rest assured that they will remain in office if they so
choose. As such, the threat to judicial independence posed by the Act is somewhat limited.
At the state level, however, most JCOs have the power to remove a
judge from office or recommend removal in addition to their power to publicly
censure a judge (or recommend such action) or to take or recommend similar
types of discipline. Moreover, most state judges do not enjoy life tenure and are
subject to reappointment or retention elections after a number of years. Thus,
the removal power enjoyed by JCOs could potentially serve as a greater threat to
judicial independence.
In practice, however, the types of actions for which judges are normally
disciplined rarely pose much of a threat to judicial independence. For one,
judges are usually only removed after repeated instances of misconduct on the

157

See

158

See Lubet, supra note 20, at 59.

DUBOIS,

supra note 46, at 18.

159 See generally Wendell L. Griffen, JudicialAccountability and Discipline,LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1998, at 75, 76 (discussing the case of Judge Harold Baer, who, after a controversial decision, faced calls for impeachment by Senator Robert Dole and a suggestion from the
Clinton White House that Baer resign).
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bench or repeated and flagrant misbehavior off the bench.1 60 More importantly,
much of the JCO caseloads seem to involve bad behavior on the part of judges,
rather than bad decision-making. The essence of judicial independence is that a
judge should be free to decide a case based on the judge's view of the law and
the judge's conscience.1 61 A quick reading of state appellate court decisions
concerning disciplinary investigations by JCOs suggests that most of the bases
for disciplinary actions taken by JCOs simply do not touch on this concern. As
Steven Lubet has pointed out, there is little concern that JCOs pose any threat to
judicial independence when they take disciplinary measures against judges for
using his office to coerce the payment of a debt to his daughter,
fixing traffic tickets (or attempting to), or attempting to recruit
litigants as Amway sales representatives to the judge's own financial benefit. Nor would fairness and impartiality be threatened when a judge faces discipline for vulgar sexual harassment
(or worse),162public intoxication, or interference with law enforcement.
The distinction between disciplining a judge for misconduct and disciplining a judge for faulty decision-making is crucial. For example, abusive be65
163
civil litigants,' 64 criminal defendants,
havior by a judge toward attorneys,
witnesses, 166 or jurors 167 may involve a judge's decision as to how to run his or
her courtroom, but it has little relation to the judge's function of applying the
law to the facts of a case that the goal of judicial independence seeks to protect.

160

MARY L.

VOLCANSEK ET AL., JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

109 (1996) [hereinafter

VOLCANSEK,

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT].

161

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

162

Lubet, supra note 20, at 62.

163

See, e.g., In re Bennett, 267 N.W.2d 914 (Mich. 1978) (suspending judge for one year for

regularly employing obscenities in dealing with attorneys, including calling one attorney a "dumb
ass" in front of the attorney's client).
164
See, e.g., In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1982) (ordering public censure of judge who
made racist remarks about African-American litigants in the presence of litigants).
165
See, e.g., McCartney v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 526 P.2d 268 (Cal. 1974) (ordering public censure of judge who, inter alia, called a criminal defendant "a liar, a cheat, and a
deadbeat.").
166
See, e.g., In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603
(Wis. 1989) (suspending judge for two years for, inter alia, impugning the competence of an
expert witness in court).
167
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 657 P.2d 372 (Cal. 1983) (removing judge for conduct toward veniremen, including asking an African-American venireman who
was a grocery store clerk, "What is the price of watermelon per pound?").
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Occasionally, judges are disciplined for actions that are tangentially related to decision-making; however, even here, discipline is usually only imposed
when a judge has abandoned or overstepped the judicial role. For example, failing to decide motions at all involves an abdication of the judge's decisionmaking function. 168 Similarly, engaging in ex parte communications with one
of the litigants may aid a judge in the decision-making process, but such action
can result in, or at the very least create the appearance of, the failure to provide a
forum free from bias. 169
The most direct threat that JCOs pose to judicial independence is when
they take disciplinary action against judges based on the actual content of
judges' decisions. 17 Even here, the record produces mixed results as to the
threat posed by JCOs. There is almost universal agreement that legal error
should rarely serve as the basis for disciplinary proceedings.' 7 1 Isolated legal
errors can be corrected on appeal or through mandamus. Indeed, several states
specifically provide that the JCO may not take action against a judge for making
findings of fact, reaching a legal conclusion, or applying the law as the judge
understands it in the absence of fraud, corrupt motive, or bad faith.' 72 Instead,
1 73
judges have generally faced sanctions for legal errors in only three situations.
First, some judges have been removed or otherwise disciplined for committing
egregious legal error, such as the routine failure to advise defendants of their
constitutional right to an attorney or pronouncing defendants guilty without informing them of the charges they face.174 Second, judges have been removed or
otherwise disciplined for the commission of a continuing pattern of legal error. 175 Finally, judges have been removed or otherwise disciplined for the commission of legal error in bad faith, i.e., with a specific intent to use the judicial
office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew76or should have known was
beyond the legitimate exercise of judicial authority. 1
168 See, e.g, Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Spencer, 725 So. 2d 171 (Miss. 1998)
(removing judge for, inter alia, failing to dispose of 334 pending cases at the time complaint was
filed).
169
See, e.g., Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd. v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358 (Pa. 1987) (removing judge
from office where judge contacted defendant, without notice to the plaintiff, and suggested a defense motion, which the judge subsequently granted at a hearing).
170
See Lubet, supra note 20, at 65.
171

See, e.g., In re Barr, 13 S.W.2d 525, 544 (Tex. 1998).

172

See, e.g., ARK. R.P. JUD. DiscIp. & DISABILITY COMM'N 9B.

173

See In re Barr, 13 S.W.2d at 544.
See, e.g., McGee v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 452 N.E.2d 1258 (N.Y. 1983).

174

175
See, e.g., Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Byers, 757 So. 2d 961 (Miss. 2000)
(publicly reprimanding judge for a series of legal errors and abuses of power).
176

See In re Barr, 13 S.W.2d at 545.
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In each of these instances, the need for judicial accountability to the law
overrides the potential abstract concerns over the damage to judicial independence that the imposition of sanctions might cause. 177 As the Supreme Court
explained in Bradley v. Fisher178 over a century ago, ultimately the purpose of
preserving judicial independence is not to protect judges, but to protect the public's interest in having a judiciary capable of deciding matters without fear of
consequences. 179 A judge who routinely deprives defendants of important constitutional rights or intentionally ignores clear and established precedent undermines the core value of judicial independence.' 80 Similarly, a pattern of consistent legal errors suggests that a judge lacks competence and cannot be trusted to
exercise the functions of the judicial office for the benefit of the public.1 81 Sanctions in such cases serve as a way of holding the judge accountable to the rule of
law, and if the judge cannot
live up to that standard, the judge does not merit his
82
or her independence.'
2.

The Effect on Judicial Accountability

In appointive and merit selection states, JCOs do little to undermine the
goal of judicial accountability. Indeed, as mentioned, one of the reasons behind
passage of the Judicial Councils and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act and the
creation of JCOs in the first place was to add a measure of accountability to
systems that placed a premium on judicial independence. 183 In theory, JCOs can
only improve judicial accountability in appointive and merit selection states.
In the case of disciplinary measures short of removal, JCOs help improve judicial accountability in at least two ways. First, in appointive states,
177
See generally id. at 553 (stating that lawless judicial conduct is "as threatening to the concept of government as is the loss of judicial independence.").
178 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335 (1871).
179 Id. at 349 n.16.
180
See generally In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 936 (Wash. 1999) ("Judicial independence does not equate to unbridled discretion to .
disregard the requirements of the law, or to
ignore the constitutional rights of defendants.").
181 Lubet, supra note 20, at 72; see also In re Conduct of Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 209 (Or.
1994) ("Removal from office is appropriate where.., a series of misconduct calls into question
the judge's competence and integrity.").
182 There are, of course, more complicated cases, such as the case of Justice J. Anthony Kline
of the California Appellate Court, who dissented in a case on the ground that he was unwilling as
a matter of conscience to apply controlling precedent. See Lubet, supra note 20, at 65-67; Sankar,
supra note 91, at 1233-36. In response, the California Commission on Judicial Performance
(CCJP) charged Kline with willful misconduct in office. Eventually, the CCJP withdrew its
charge. Sankar, supra note 91, at 1236. Actions such as Justice Kline's seem to embody the very
principles underlying the importance of judicial independence on the one hand, while, on the
other, could be seen as a refusal to perform the role of a judge.
183 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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public access to the disciplinary process of JCOs is a way of ensuring greater
accountability in the sense of preventing the courts from appearing as an unregulated oligarchy. Although citizens are incapable of using the information
gleaned from the disciplinary process to directly effectuate the removal of a
sitting judge, the instigation of complaints by members of the public and participation in the actual disciplinary process by non-lawyers help to keep the public connected to their judiciary. The availability of information concerning the
disciplinary process can be a way of improving the public's perception of judiI4
cial self-regulation and increasing the trust the public places in the judiciary.'
Second, in merit selection states, citizens can actually take the information made
available by JCOs concerning a disciplinary matter and use it to effectuate
change. 185 In theory, the electorate can factor the disciplinary measures taken by
a JCO against a particular judge into their decision as to whether the judge
should be retained. Thus, supporters of both the weak and strong views of judicial accountability should have little problem with disciplinary actions short of
removal taken by JCOs in appointive or merit selection states.
Similarly, supporters of both views of judicial accountability have little
to complain about regarding the removal of judges by JCOs in appointive or
merit selection states. As mentioned, for proponents of the weak view of judicial accountability, accountability is, in some respects, simply a concomitant of
judicial independence. 8 6 If a judge ceases to perform his or her function and
behaves in a lawless or unethical manner, the public trust has been violated and
some measure of accountability is necessary. Thus, removal of a judge for violating that trust squares nicely with the weak conception of judicial accountability. For proponents of the strong view of accountability, the removal of judges
for misconduct also should merit no strong objections because the public's role
in selecting judges has already been eliminated or weakened in appointive and
merit selection states, so any steps toward connecting the public with the judiciary should meet with little disapproval.
B.

Effect of JCOs in Elective States

In states that employ partisan or non-partisan elections to select their
judges, the goal of judicial accountability takes precedent over the goal of judicial independence. In cases of lesser forms of discipline, such as public censure
or reprimand, JCOs do not necessarily undermine the goal of judicial accountability. However, when JCOs remove a judge from office or recommend removal, to some extent they work at cross purposes with popular elections in
promoting accountability.

185

See Sahl, supra note 39, at 248.
See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.

186

See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.

184
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1.

The Effect on Judicial Independence

For some of the same reasons described previously, JCOs pose minimal
danger to the goal of judicial independence in elective states. For one, as mentioned, most of the disciplinary matters addressed by JCOs do not implicate
judicial functions associated with judicial independence. 87 For another, in elective states, the decision has already been made that the goal of judicial independence should be somewhat subordinate to the goal of judicial accountability.
As such, popular elections pose a far greater threat to decisional independence
than does the threat of discipline imposed by JCOs.
2.

The Effect on Judicial Accountability
a.

PotentiallyDamagingEffects

The effect of JCOs on the goal of accountability is somewhat more
complicated. The power of most JCOs to remove judges from office or to recommend such action to the state's highest court could be expected to offend
proponents of the strong view of judicial accountability in several ways. First,
in all states with elective judiciaries, at least some members of JCOs are appointed by the governor, the legislature, the state's highest court, or some combination thereof. 188 Thus, as is the case with nominating commissions in states
that employ merit selection to select their judges, the removal of judges in elective states is set into motion by individuals who are unaccountable to the electorate.
In some elective states, unelected JCO members actually impose sanctions, including removal from office. 89 Moreover, in a few elective states, a
JCO's imposition of the sanction of removal cannot be rejected. For example,
in Alabama, the Supreme Court can review the record of the proceedings of the
Court of the Judiciary, but if the record shows by clear and convincing evidence
that the charge or charges have been committed, the Supreme Court lacks the
authority to reduce or reject the sanction imposed by the Court of the JudiciSee supra notes 161-76 and accompanying text.
188
See ALA. CONST. amend. 328; ARK. CONST. amend. 66; GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; ILL.
CONST. art. IV, § 15; Ky. CONST. § 121; LA. CONST. art. V, § 25, MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30;
Miss. CONST., art. VI, § 177A; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 11; NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 21; N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 22; TEx. CONST. art. 5, § I-A; IDAHO CODE § 1-2101(1) (Lexis 2002); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 490.15 (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-375 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-2302 (2002); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102(a) (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.64.020
(West 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.83(1) (West 2002); OHIO GOV'T JUD. R. I; W. VA. R. JUD.
Discip. P. 1.3.
189
See ALA. CONST. amend. 581, § 6.18(a); ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 15(e); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §
187

22; PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b)(5); NEV. REV. STAT ANN. § 1.4653 (Michie 2002); Ky. SuP. CT. R.
4.020(1)(b).
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ary. 190 In Illinois, unelected members of the Illinois Courts Commission decide
the appropriate sanction to apply to elected judges, including up to removal, and
their decision is unreviewable.' 91 Thus, in these states, the same types of arguments against entrusting the selection of judges to a group of unelected "elites '92 can just as easily be leveled against entrusting the removal of elected
judges to unelected JCOs.
This concern over entrusting the power to initiate removal proceedings
to non-elected officials dovetails nicely with the main concern over allowing
JCOs to remove or recommend removal of judges: the potential disfranchisement of voters. In elective states, voters have been given the right to decide
whom they wish to serve as judges. When JCOs and state supreme courts remove elected judges from office, they are undoing that choice. In the words of
one state supreme court judge, "[i]t is not a light thing for this Court to assume
the power to say to [the voters], 'You have lawfully elected this judge, but we
have determined that he cannot serve you., 1 93 The removal mechanisms of
JCOs may improve accountability in the sense of providing a check on the
power of the judiciary, but they may threaten accountability in the sense of allowing the voters to hold judges accountable for their behavior.
There are clearly cases in which a judge's misbehavior is so severe that
it actually damages the judicial system and unquestionably warrants removal.
Likewise, there are clearly cases where the majority of voters, if they were
aware of the charged misconduct, would almost certainly be in favor of removing a sitting judge. However, the difficulty arises in cases where the damage to
the system or the will of the voters is not quite so clear. In some cases, reasonable minds could differ as to whether a judge's offense was so egregious as to
undermine the judicial system. Similarly, a majority of voters might not view
certain types of judicial misconduct as justifying removal and would be willing
to overlook such misconduct in the next election, whereas lawyers and judges
might conclude that the same behavior warrants removal.' 94 If a JCO and state
supreme court are not on the same page with the voting public in these kinds of
instances, the removal mechanism of JCOs carries with it the potential to undermine the public's right to choose.
In this respect, JCOs and reviewing courts in elective states face a
quandary similar to that of legislators during the impeachment process. Regardless of whether it is a legislature removing a judge through the impeachment
190

Boggan v. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n of State, 759 So. 2d 550, 555 (Ala. 1999).
191 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15; Pincham v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 681 F. Supp. 1309, 1320
(N.D. Il. 1988), affd, 872 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1989).
192 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
193 In re Hardy, 240 S.E.2d 367, 375 (N.C. 1978) (Lake, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
194 See generally Boyer, supra note 67, at 142 (stating that the electorate is willing "to forgive
small transgressions").
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process or a JCO or supreme court removing a judge through the disciplinary
process, removal raises difficult questions as to when it is appropriate to undo
the results of a democratic election. During the Clinton impeachment, for example, the White House and numerous academics argued that impeachment
would allow the legislature to nullify the will of the majority. 195 Although some
have questioned this view of impeachment,196 the removal of an elected official
raises serious concerns regarding the public's will, particularly in instances like
the Clinton impeachment where a majority of Americans apparently believed
that President Clinton's conduct did not merit removal. 197 In the case of elected
judges, the concerns may be even more pronounced as, unlike presidents, judges
are elected by a direct vote of the people.
Moreover, the differences in the roles played by judges and officers of
the other two branches makes the removal of elected judges an even thornier
issue. There is a general consensus that in order to impeach an elected official,
the charged conduct must somehow seriously undermine the government and
compromise the accused's ability to govern. 98 In the classic case, the charged
misconduct involves an abuse of the public trust made possible by the powers of
office.1 99 In other words, there is some nexus between the official's misconduct
and his official duties. 200 As the divergence of opinion as to whether President
Clinton had committed such an offense illustrates, this is certainly an imprecise
standard for an officer of the executive branch. °1 However, the job require195

See Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and FunctionalDisputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian

Device, 49 DuKE L.J. 1, 6 n.13 (1999).
196
See id. at 7.
197

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Madison Got It Backward, N.Y.

198

See Susan Low Bloch, A Report Card on the Impeachment: Judging the Institutions that

TIMES,

Feb. 16, 1999, at A2.

Judged President Clinton, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 143, 149; id. at 149
n.34 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, Rule of Law v. Rule of Life, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 1998, at
A15).
199
Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting the Law of Impeachment in Perspective, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J.
905, 913 (1999) (stating that the "great majority" of commentators have concluded that an impeachable offense is one that is a "political crime," i.e., an abuse of power that "could only be
committed by public officials by virtue of the public offices" they hold); see also id. at 921 (referring to this as the "paradigmatic case"). See generally Jack N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and History of Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 682, 687 (1999) ("[T]he examples
the delegates used to describe acts warranting impeachment ... all confirm that they were thinking primarily, indeed exclusively, about failure to perform the duties of office or a misuse of its
powers, in ways that manifestly endangered the general public good."); Cass R. Sunstein, Impeachment and Stability, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 699, 702 (1999) ("The clear lesson of [early
constitutional debates] is that ... the Founders were thinking, exclusively or principally, of largescale abuses of distinctly public authority.").
200
Gerhardt, supra note 199, at 921.
201

During a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee, the committee heard testimony

from a number of constitutional experts on the question of impeachment. Of these, seven believed
President Clinton had committed an impeachable offense, and eight believed that the accusations
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ments of a judge are fundamentally different than those of offices in the other
branches. Impartiality, for example, is a prerequisite for the exercise of judicial
powers. Therefore, distinctions between a judge's private life and his public
duties may become blurred. In addition, judges, unlike presidents, are said to
have a duty to embody or symbolize the law. Thus, in the words of Richard
Posner, even a judge's "relatively minor crimes gravely undermine the system
of legal justice." 202 Thus, the impeachment standard may cast a wider net concerning the types of impeachable offenses for judges than it would other elected
officials.2 o3
The situation is made more confusing in the case of elected judges because the standards for removal of judges and other public officers through impeachment and removal of judges through the JCO mechanism are not always
one and the same. Some states limit grounds for impeachment to matters of
illegality, whereas JCOs almost uniformly have the power to remove or recommend the removal of judges for a host of reasons having nothing to do with illegal conduct, including violations of a code of judicial conduct.2 °4 In some cases,
such as the acceptance of bribes, removal would be proper through both the impeachment process and JCO-initiated action.20 5 However, in some instances, it
is debatable whether conduct constituting a removable offense through the JCO
process would also constitute an impeachable offense (at least if the same conduct had been committed by other public officers).
For example, in Wisconsin, all civil officers are subject to impeachment
"for corrupt conduct in office, or for crimes and misdemeanors ....,,206 How-

ever, judges in Wisconsin face the possibility of removal through the JCO
mechanism for conduct that extends beyond corruption or illegality, including

either did not rise to the level of impeachable offenses or did not warrant impeachment. Bloch,
supra note 198, at 150 n.36.
202

RICHARD POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF

PRESIDENT CLINTON 104 (1999).

203

See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 106-07 (1996)

(suggesting a higher behavioral standard for judges than for executive officers); Martin H. Redish,
JudicialDiscipline,JudicialIndependence, and the Constitution: A Textual and StructuralAnalysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 684 (1999) ("[Lleading scholars appear to agree that a special impeachment standard is appropriate for members of the federal judiciary ....
").Not surprisingly,
the nation's history contains several instances where federal judges have been impeached for
offenses that seemingly would have little to do with their official duties. See Gerhardt, supra note
199, at 917 (noting the conviction and removal of Judge John Pickering for public drunkenness
and blasphemy); id. at 923 (noting the impeachment and removal of federal district judge Harry
Claibome for income tax evasion).
204
See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
205

See COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra note 99, at 206, 214 (listing bribery as a specific basis

for impeachment in some states and stating that such conduct always results in removal by JCOs).
206

WIS. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
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"willful violation of a rule of the code of judicial ethics. 2 °7 In Washington,
judicial officers may only be impeached for "high crimes or misdemeanors, or
malfeasance in office. 20 8 Yet, in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against

Turco,209 Washington's Commission on Judicial Conduct recommended that a
judge be removed from office for striking or pushing his wife to the floor in a
public setting - conduct that simply violated Washington's Canons of Judicial
Conduct.210 It is certainly questionable whether such conduct, if committed by
an executive officer, would qualify as a "high crime or misdemeanor" or "malfeasance in office." Although the Washington Supreme Court ultimately rejected the recommendation to remove Judge Turco, elected judges in other states
face the specter of removal as a result of JCO proceedings for conduct that
might not be sufficient to serve as the basis of impeachment proceedings. 21'
Another accountability concern is the danger, inherent in the removal of
any elected official from office, that politics may be at the heart of the attempt to
remove. One of the concerns of the impeachment process has always been that
the process is subject to political intrigue. 212 Some have argued that, at the federal level, a stricter standard of judicial behavior is justified because partisan
politics are more likely to play a role in the impeachment of elected presidents
than in the impeachment of appointed judges.2 13 Ignoring for a moment the calls
for the impeachment of federal judges that occasionally ensue as a result of a
controversial decision,21 4 this justification evaporates when applied to elective
judiciaries. Indeed, the concern over faction and politics might arguably be
greater in the JCO context given the fact that there are fewer members of such
commissions to convince of the need for removal than there are state legislators
to convince of the need for impeachment, and the fact that at least some of the
207

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 757.81(4) (West 2002).

208

WASH. CONST. art. V, § 2.

209

970 P.2d 731 (Wash. 1999).

210

Id. at 736.

211

Compare MICH. CONST. art. II, § 7 (listing impeachment grounds as "corrupt conduct in

office or for crimes or misdemeanors") with In re Seitz, 495 N.W.2d 559 (Mich. 1993) (removing
judge for abusing contempt power, maintaining hostile attitude toward employees, willfully neglecting docket, and refusing to respond to requests from judicial agency). Compare MONT. CODE
ANN. § 5-5-401 (2002) (listing impeachment grounds as "felonies and misdemeanors or malfeasance in office") with Harris v. Smartt, 57 P.3d 58 (Mont. 2002) (rejecting recommendation of
removal from office and instead suspending judge without pay for accessing sexually explicit
websites at work), vacated in part on other grounds, 68 P.3d 889 (Mont. 2003).
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See Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged and Other InstitutionalRamifications of

the Clinton Scandals, 60 MD. L. REv. 59, 74 (2001) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Impeachment De-

fanged].
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See POSNER, supra note 202, at 104.
214

See Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged, supra note 212, at 74 (noting the calls for the resig-

nation of Judge Harold Baer).
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members of such commissions are themselves appointed by elected officials. If,
as some have charged, politics are at play during the selection process, 215 it
seems reasonable to conclude that the potential exists for politics to enter into
the equation during the removal process.
Given the potential encroachment on the public's right to choose posed
by JCOs, the uncertain standards for the impeachment and removal of judges,
and the ever-present danger of political intrigue, one might expect to see some
other limitations on the ability of JCOs to remove or recommend the removal of
judges from office in elective states. However, West Virginia is the only state
that employs popular elections as the principal means of selecting most of its
judges that denies its JCO the power to remove a judge from office or recommend removal for misconduct.'1 6 Although West Virginia's Judicial Hearing
Board is authorized by statute to involuntarily retire a judge because of "advancing years and attendant physical or mental incapacity" and to recommend a variety of sanctions for misconduct to the Supreme Court of Appeals,217 the state
constitution provides that a "justice or judge may be removed only by impeachment" in accordance with provisions of the constitution.21 8
One might also expect to find some expressed reluctance on the part of
high courts in elective states to remove an elected judge based on the findings or
recommendations of JCOs. Indeed, from time to time, an opinion from an
elected appellate court expresses some reluctance about removing an elected
judge from office for misconduct; however, such reluctance is only infrequently
voiced. There are a handful of decisions that express the view that when a judge
is charged with misconduct during a prior term and has been re-elected despite
such misconduct, the public has forgiven the judge and removal is, therefore,
inappropriate. 2 9 The rationale for such decisions is that the public is "the ultimate judge and jury in a democratic society ....,,220 However, most courts that
have considered the issue have rejected this "forgiveness doctrine" either outright or on the grounds that it only applies where the misconduct was a matter of
215

See supra note 74-76 and accompanying text.

216

ALA. CONST.

amend. 581, § 6.18; ARK. CONST. amend. 66;

GA. CONST. art. VI,

§ 7; ILL.

CONST. art. VI, § 15; KY. CONST. § 121; LA. CONST. art. V, § 25; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30;
MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 177A; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 11; NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 21; N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 22; PA. CONST. art. V,§ 18; TEx. CONST. art. 5, § I-a; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 8; Wis. CONST. art. 7, § 11; IDAHO CODE § 1-2102(4) (Lexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 490.16
(West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-23-02 (2002); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 2.64.055 (West 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.89 (West 2002); OHio GOV'T
JuD. R. III.
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See State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So. 2d 609, 615 (Fla. 1974); In re Bailey, 490 N.E.2d

818 (N.Y. 1986); In re Carrillo, 542 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Tex. 1976).
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public knowledge at the time of re-election or where the state constitution or
applicable statute limits the authority of the JCO to prevent the judge from holding future office.22' Indeed, most decisions from state appellate courts removing
a judge from office based on the decisions or recommendations from JCOs contain no mention of the tension between maintaining an ethical judiciary and undoing the decision of the electorate.
Occasionally, supreme courts in states with elective judiciaries do acknowledge the dilemma they face in removing a judge who has been elected.
The Supreme Court of Washington, for example, devoted considerable time to
this problem in In re Disciplinary ProceedingsAgainst Turco, the case involving the judge accused of striking or pushing his wife to the ground in public.222
Recognizing that one of the goals of sanctions is to preserve public confidence
in the administration of justice, the court indicated that there are some types of
misbehavior that are better left to be dealt with by the electorate. 223 Although
some extrajudicial conduct might be reprehensible, sanctions are only appropriate for behavior that "affect[s] the judge's integrity or ability to judge impartially," in other words, where "there is an articulable nexus between the extrajudicial conduct and the judge's duties. 224 In other cases, the public should be
left to decide whether a judge is worthy of sitting on the bench, lest the court
intrude on the public's right to choose its elected officials. According to the
Supreme Court of Washington, "[b]oth the Commission on Judicial Conduct
and this Court must, therefore, take care to respect and observe the people's
categorical right to choose their own judges, and to avoid interfering with that
right except for manifest violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 2 25
Opinions such as Turco, however, are relatively rare. From time to
time, state supreme courts expressly note the tension between the goals of imposing judicial discipline and respecting the public's right to choose its judicial
officers, 226 and in some cases a judge's history of re-election seems to be a miti221

See In re Martin, 275 S.E.2d 412, 423 (N.C. 1981); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Ethics, 2

GEO. J. LEG. ETHics 1, 14 (1988).
222 970 P.2d 731 (Wash. 1999).
223

Id. at 740.

224

Id.

225

Id.

226

See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 94-70, 454 S.E.2d 780, 783 (Ga. 1995) (Benham,

J., dissenting) ("When a judge has been elected by the people, removal from office is tantamount
to impeachment; therefore, the violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct should be proved by
'clear and convincing' evidence."); In re Huckaby, 656 So. 2d 292, 298 (La. 1995) ("[R]emoval
of a duly elected member of the judiciary is a serious undertaking which should only be borne
with the utmost care so as not to unduly disrupt the public's choice for service in the judiciary.");
In re Hardy, 240 S.E.2d 367, 375 (N.C. 1978) (Lake, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("It is not a light thing for this Court to assume the power to say to the people of North Carolina,
'You have lawfully elected this judge, but we have determined that he cannot serve you."'); In re
Lowery, 999 S.W.2d 639, 662 (Tex. 1998) (addressing whether removing an elected judge from
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gating factor against removal.227 However, as a percentage of the total number
of decisions to remove sitting judges in states that elect their judges, such comments are relatively rare. By and large, most courts rarely mention the tension
between the goals underlying removal from office and the goals of popular elections,. and their decisions are generally indistinguishable from decisions in appointive or merit-selection states.
b.

Mitigating Factors

Nearly all states that elect their judges, therefore, see some role for
JCOs to play in the removal process. Despite the anti-democratic tendencies of
JCOs, several factors offset concern as to their impact on judicial accountability
under the strong conception of that term. First, in the majority of states that
employ partisan elections as the primary means of judicial selection, JCOs are
228 Alonly empowered to recommend, not impose, the sanction of removal.
though a number of states authorize their JCOs to impose lesser forms of discipline,229 the members of the state's highest court, who, by and large, are elected,
office would disenfranchise the voters); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kaiser, 759 P.2d
392, 401 (Wash. 1988) (noting that courts "should be slow to overturn the results of an election
and deprive the people of the right to elect our judges" and that the sanction of removal "should be
sparingly applied"). See generally In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850, 859 (Minn. 1988) (rejecting
JCO's recommended sanction of removal, suspending judge for one year without pay, and stating
that the citizens of the judge's county "are in a position to evaluate to his performance" and "can
remove him by ballot if they determine we have been too lenient.").
227
See McCullough v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 776 P.2d 259 (Cal. 1989) (listing the
fact that judge had twice been elected as a mitigating factor); In re Skinner, 690 N.E.2d 484, 486
(N.Y. 1997) (imposing censure, instead of removal, in part because judge "has for nearly four
decades been the elected choice of the voters to hold the office .... with no evidence of any prior
complaints regarding his judicial service."). See generally Idaho Judicial Council v. Becker, 834
P.2d 290, 294 (Idaho 1992) (rejecting JCO recommendation of removal because removal "would
deprive the judicial system of an experienced judge who was elected by the voters" and "who can
be a good judge if he can control his addiction to alcohol ..
"); Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Byers, 757 So. 2d 961, 973 (Miss. 2000) (rejecting JCO recommendation of removal
because the judge had "already been removed by the people of her electoral district."); In re
Starcher, 457 S.E.2d 147, 152 (W. Va. 1995) (Neely, J., dissenting) (dissenting to imposition of
stricter sanction than recommended by JCO and noting that judge was so popular in his county
"that he will be a judge until the day he voluntarily decides to retire or the Lord decides to call
him home.").
228
ARK. CONST. amend, 66; GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; LA. CONST. art. V, § 25; MICH. CONST.
art. VI, § 30; Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 177A; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 11; TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 1a; WIS. CONST. art. 7, § 11; IDAHO CODE § 1-2102(4) (Lexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 490.16
(West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-23-01, -02 (2002);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.64.055 (West 2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.85 (West 2001); Omno
Gov'T JUD. R. III.
229
See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.64.055 (empowering Commission on Judicial Conduct to admonish, reprimand, or censure judge and providing that commission may recommend
suspension or removal to state supreme court).
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possess the removal power. Thus, at least in theory, the electorate can hold the
elected members of the reviewing court accountable for their decision to remove
a judge. If the unelected members of a state JCO had unreviewable authority to
remove a judge, JCOs would be incapable of ensuring accountability under the
strong conception of that term and would, in fact, have the authority to weaken
judicial accountability.23 ° Indeed, as the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal has stated, placing the power of removal in the hands of
elected officials is essential to ensuring some form of accountability: "Judging
whether the public trust has been violated or the power granted by the people
misused is fundamentally a political decision, one that should be made by officers who answer to the voters."2 3 '
Second, judges are usually removed only for the most egregious conduct.232 In most instances of removal, a judge's misconduct is either extreme,
involves a pattern of misbehavior suggesting willful disregard of the law or incompetence, or involves a combination of both. 3 Therefore, it seems safe to
conclude that, in most cases, judges who are removed through the JCO process
would have been defeated in a re-election contest, had the public been aware of
the misconduct, or impeached, had the legislature gotten around to it and the
state constitution allowed such action.
In this sense, many of the removals that take place through the JCO
process simply provide a more efficient method of removing unethical judges
than do the impeachment and election processes. 34 If a JCO lacks the power to
230

See generally Sankar, supra note 91, at 1258 (arguing that on the federal level, the Judicial

Councils and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act cannot truly vindicate accountability as "only
the public or its politically elected representatives can do that.").
231
Charles Gardner Geyh, Highlighting a Low Point on a High Court: Some Thoughts on the
Removal of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larsen and the Limits of Judicial SelfRegulation, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1041, 1074 (1995) (quoting REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL
232

See

23 (1993)).

HEARINGS OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL

727 (June 24,

1993) (Statement of Frances Zemans, President, American Judicature Society), cited in Geyh,
supra note 231, at 1074.
233
See In re Judge No. 491, 287 S.E.2d 2, 3 (Ga. 1982) (removing justice of the peace after
plea of nolo contendere to charges of aiding and abetting her mother-in-law in fraudulently obtaining welfare benefits); In re Field, 576 P.2d 348, 354 (Or. 1978) (removing judge for general incompetence, disregard for constitutional rights of defendant, and general inability to cope with
pressures of office); In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420, 436 (Tex. 1977) (removing judge for receipt of
bribe); In re Complaint Against Raineri, 306 N.W.2d 699, 700-01 (Wis. 1981) (per curiam) (removing judge after three felony convictions, including false declarations before a grand jury and
threatening a grand jury witness).
234
This argument applies to removal of lower court judges, not necessarily to removal of
judges on a state's court of last resort. As mentioned, most states allow judges to appeal JCO
decisions to the state's highest court or give that court authority to adopt or reject the recommendation of a JCO. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. If the judge in question is a
lower court judge, this method of removal is preferable to impeachment or reliance on popular
elections for the reasons stated infra. However, when the judge in question sits on the state's
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remove a judge or recommend removal, it would be exceedingly difficult in
most cases to remove from office a judge who has abandoned the judicial role.
As most judges stand for re-election only once every few years, elections do a
poor job of preventing an unethical sitting judge from flaunting the law, abusing
litigants, and generally undermining public confidence in the judiciary in the
interim. Thus, one of the goals of imposing discipline on judges would be
thwarted. In addition, as voters typically cast their votes in judicial contests
lacking specific information about judges, and as many judges run unopposed,
voters are unlikely to be able to remove a judge based on instances of prior misconduct unless the misconduct has been highly publicized. 235 Although Dubois
argues that party labels provide an effective mechanism for voters to make decisions regarding judicial policy, 236 party labels do absolutely nothing to inform
voters about a judge's record of ethical or unethical conduct on the bench.
Thus, in terms of providing accountability for judicial misconduct, elections do
not do a particularly good job. JCOs can help compensate for this weakness.
Finally, given the role of a judge in constitutional government and the
weaknesses of other disciplinary measures, the anti-democratic aspects of JCOs
are simply features of the organizations that may have to be tolerated in order to
protect the public and promote trust in the judiciary. Even the most ardent supporters of the popular election of judges acknowledge that judges are not merely
"politicians in robes. 23 7 Despite their inherent policymaking powers, judges
occupy a position of enormous trust. As such, the discipline, including occasional removal, of judges is essential to preserving the public's respect for the
judiciary.
In short, the JCO removal process may, in some respects, stand in opposition to the strong conception of judicial accountability; however, it does promote accountability in the sense that it helps ensure that judges remain accountable to the law which they were elected to apply. As elections and other removal methods are generally ill-equipped to effectuate this goal, JCOs need to
have the ability to recommend the removal of judges, subject to review by an
appellate court. The trick is in devising a workable standard as to when removal
is appropriate.
Furthermore, the ability of JCOs to impose or recommend lesser sanctions, such as public reprimand, censure, or suspension, is entirely consistent
with any notion of judicial accountability. Ifit is true that "judges are elected in

highest court, "a system of judicial discipline in which the ultimate disciplinary body is the court
on which the miscreant judge sits inevitably creates an apparent, if not a real, conflict of interest."
Geyh, supra note 231, at 1050. Geyh argues compellingly that impeachment is the best method
for dealing with such cases. Id. at 1075.
235
See COMISKY & PATWERSON, supra note 99, at 209.
236

See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.

237

DuBoIs, supra note 46, at 24.
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a climate of nearly total voter ignorance, ' '238 then the fact that a judge has been
publicly reprimanded for judicial misconduct can be a potentially valuable
source of information for voters. The public at large may have difficulty understanding why a judge might be justified (or correct) in voting to overturn a death
penalty conviction or upholding a damage cap in a medical malpractice case;
however, the public is quite capable of making a rational decision as to whether
to re-elect a judge who has been censured for abusing litigants in open court. In
non-judicial contests, voters cast their ballots based on a variety of information
about candidates, including the character of a candidate. Thus, without active
enforcement of the rules of judicial conduct and dissemination of information
concerning any disciplinary action taken against a particular judge, the voting
public may be denied information that it might find quite relevant in making its
decision about a judge.
Thus, JCOs can potentially serve as a tool for better educating the public about the qualifications of the judges it elects. A more informed electorate
can make more informed decisions about who it elects, thus strengthening one
of the weakest arguments of those in favor of popular election of judges. 239 In
addition to improving the electoral process, JCOs can also serve as an important
check on the power of runaway judges, thus better keeping judges connected to
the public and the rule of law.2 4'
V. How JCOs CAN IMPROVE ACCOUNTABILITY

In order to balance the goals of promoting ethical conduct within the judiciary, respecting the right of voters to choose their own judges, and promoting
true accountability, JCOs and reviewing courts in elective states must work together while being mindful of their respective roles.
A.

Aggressive Enforcement of Ethical Rules and Supreme CourtImposition
of Sanctions

Perhaps the most obvious method of improving accountability through
the use of JCOs is to insist that they aggressively and competently enforce a
state's ethical rules for judges. Some state JCOs, such as New York's Commission on Judicial Conduct, have developed a reputation for aggressive enforce238

Geyh, supra note 231, at 1064 (quoting Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Bruce Kauf-

man).
See generally DuBoiS, supra note 46, at 22 (calling for strict enforcement of the Code of
Judicial Conduct to reduce some of the concerns over the effect of popular elections on judicial
independence); Boyer, supra note 67, at 143 (arguing in favor of popular election and opining that
Florida's Judicial Qualification Commission's record "has not been impressive").
240
See generally Sahl, supra note 39, at 248 (arguing that a disciplinary process that is more
239

open to public review would "prevent the courts from becoming less accountable to or separate
from the public.").
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ment of their state's ethical rules. 24' Others, such as the Illinois Court Commission, have developed a reputation for laxness and inaction.2 42 Although it is
probably true that the majority of complaints received by JCOs are filed by litigants who were simply displeased by a judge's ruling, 243 if the public is to feel
that judges are accountable, JCOs must have the resolve to take action in those
cases where there is clear evidence of misconduct.
Aggressive enforcement of ethical rules should not mean, however, that
JCOs have the ability to impose the sanction of removal themselves. As the
members of JCOs are unelected, providing them with the authority to remove
elected judges, as some states do, 2 " threatens the purpose of allowing the voters
to choose their judges in the first place. Although, from an efficiency standpoint, it makes sense to allow a JCO to recommend or impose lesser sanctions
while providing for review by the state's highest court, a decision to remove an
elected judge should come from the elected members of the state's highest
court. 4 Therefore, the sanction of removal in elective states should only come
from other elected individuals, whom the public can, at least in theory, hold
accountable for the decision.
State legislatures can also tighten up the language in state constitutions
or statutes that authorize JCOs to discipline judicial misconduct by imposing a
uniform standard for removal and impeachment. One solution might be to define the standards for impeachment differently for judges than for other elected
officials. Given some of the shortcomings of this approach, including its potential effect on judicial independence 246 and the difficulty in defining what constitutes an impeachable offense, such a solution is unrealistic. However, there is
no reason why a state could not amend its constitution or authorizing statute to
empower JCOs to recommend removal only where a violation of the applicable
code of judicial conduct would amount to an impeachable offense. Although
JCOs and legislatures would still be dealing with an amorphous concept, at least
the concepts would be one and the same. JCOs could then make recommendations for removal based upon whatever common history or understanding there
is within a state with respect to what constitutes an impeachable offense. As
241

VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT, supra note 160, at 109.

242

See id.; see also BOOT, supra note 89, at 21 (citing Illinois Court Commission low disci-

pline rate). See generally Boyer, supra note 67, at 143 (stating that the record of Florida's Judicial
Qualification Commission "particularly with reference to despots on the bench, has not been impressive.").
243
Keith, supra note 17, at 1405.
244

See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
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and State Justice Institute.

See MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 6

cmt. (1994).
246
See Redish, supra note 203, at 684-85; see also Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged, supra
note 212, at 73-76 (noting other problems with this approach).
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mentioned, some states make a violation of the applicable rules of judicial conduct a basis for JCO discipline.247 Although any violation of such rules could be
the basis for discipline, not all merit removal. Regardless of how a state chooses
to define a removable offense, the standard should be the same for impeachment
by the legislature and removal by a JCO. At least by articulating that removal is
only appropriate where a violation of a rule would also amount to an impeachable offense, states could help ensure that JCOs fulfill what was originally
thought to be one of their main functions: serving as a more efficient substitute
for legislative impeachment or other forms of discipline. By allowing JCOs to
recommend removal only for impeachable offenses and then subjecting such
recommendations to judicial review, states could provide a more efficient means
of removing judges while still ensuring some public accountability.
For their part, state supreme courts need to be cautious about imposing
the sanction of removal in cases of elected judges. Regardless of the method of
judicial selection employed by a state, removal is appropriate only in cases of
severe misconduct. No matter how a judge is selected, the removal of a judge
from office for anything less than conduct that severely undermines public confidence in the judiciary and demonstrates unfitness to hold office poses a threat
to judicial independence.248 In states that allow the electorate to select its
judges, the power to remove a judge can also threaten the favored goal of accountability. Various commentators have offered different standards for what
constitutes an impeachable offense 249 and this Article does not attempt the almost impossible task of articulating such a standard. However, any standard
will almost certainly involve some reference to preserving the integrity of the
judiciary and will seek to determine if there is some articulable nexus between
the charged conduct and the judge's duties.25 ° If the public is to remain confident that its electoral choices matter while simultaneously retaining confidence
in the integrity of the judiciary, any removal decision should be informed by the
twin goals of judicial accountability and judicial independence.

247

See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

248

See generally MODEL

RULES OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT

R. 6 cmt. (stating

that removal "is appropriate when the respondent's misconduct demonstrates that the respondent
is unfit to hold judicial office.").
249
See GERHARDT, supra note 203, at 107 ("actions [that] undermine confidence in the judge's
neutrality and impugn the integrity of the judicial process"); Paul E. McGreal, Impeachment as a
Remedy for Ethics Violations, 41 S. TEx. L. REv. 1369, 1389-91 (2000) (arguing that political
activity is per se impeachable and other impeachment decisions should be made by reference to
disbarment standards).
250
Cf. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Turco, 970 P.2d 731, 740 (Wash. 1999).
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ProvidingMeaningful Informationfor the Public to Assess
1.

Allowing Meaningful Access to JCO Hearings and Records

One of the most damning criticisms of the popular election of judges is
that elections are incapable of ensuring the accountability they seek to promote
because the electorate is largely ignorant about the judges it selects. 251 If the
popular election of judges is to provide any kind of true accountability, the electorate must be able to make informed decisions about judicial candidates. Although most citizens are at a disadvantage when it comes to selecting judges
based on the relative lack of information available to them, citizens do have the
ability to decide how a judge's past behavior in office bears on his or her qualifications to hold future office.252 The results of a JCO disciplinary proceeding
are a tangible piece of information that can potentially be quite relevant to the
electorate. Therefore, states that employ popular elections as the primary means
of selecting judges need to allow the public reasonable access to the results of a
disciplinary investigation and to any adjudicatory hearings.
However, allowing such access may create the potential for conflict.
There clearly exists a tension between the public's need to know about alleged
instances of judicial misconduct and a judge's interest in privacy.253 On the one
hand, if the public is completely shut out of the disciplinary process and has
only limited access to disciplinary proceedings, it may soon come to question
the legitimacy of the process. 25 4 On the other, judges are understandably fearful
of the prospect that the mere fact that a complaint is pending before a JCO could
be used against the judge by a campaign opponent.255 The tension is particularly
acute in a climate where judicial candidates are increasingly willing to employ
questionable, if not downright misleading, attack ads during the campaign. 6
Over the years, there has been a trend among the states to allow greater
openness concerning JCO proceedings.257 As previously mentioned, in a slight
majority of states, the finding of a JCO of some indicia that misconduct has occurred and the subsequent filing of formal charges makes the charges against the
judge public. 8 At this point, at least some of the records associated with the
251 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
252

See supra p. 38 and accompanying text.

253

Keith, supra note 17, at 1399.

254

Keyt, supra note 151, at 963.

255

Griffen, supra note 159, at 77.

256

See George Lardner, Jr., Speech Rights and Ethics Disputed in JudicialRaces, WASH. POST,

Oct. 8, 2000, at A13 (detailing Alabama Supreme Court race).
257
Keyt, supra note 151, at 982.
258

See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. In some states, charges become public

before the actual filing of formal charges. For example, in Arkansas, any action taken by the
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charges also are available to the public. 259 However, a slight minority of states
maintain the confidential nature of the proceedings until after a JCO holds a
formal hearing and recommends or imposes sanctions. 260 Thus, the public remains unaware of the fact that a complaint has been filed against a judge, that
the JCO has found that there exists some reason to believe that the charges of
misconduct are credible, and of any of the underlying factual record until after
the JCO has already determined that misconduct has occurred. The majority of
elective states fall into the more open first category; 261 however, at least four
maintain confidentiality until after the JCO has held a formal hearing and imposed or recommended discipline.262
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,263 the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of
the press guarantees prevented the criminal prosecution of a newspaper that had
published truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. 264 The newspaper truthfully
reported that a particular judge was under investigation for misconduct, but that
no formal charges had been filed.265 Under the Virginia statute, all papers filed
with and proceedings before the Commission, including the name of the judge
under investigation, were confidential prior to the filing of formal charges; upon
the filing of formal charges, the records of the proceedings before the Commission lost their confidential character.26 6 In reversing the conviction of the newspaper, the Court cited as a major purpose of the First Amendment the protection
of "free discussion of governmental affairs ' 267 and opined that "the law gives
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission after investigation of a complaint, regardless of
whether the charges are groundless, is communicated to the judge and becomes public. See ARK.
R.P. JuD. Discip.

& DISABILITY

COMM'N 7.

259

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.

260

See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.

261

See ALA. CONST. amend. 581, § 6.17(b); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(c); PA. CONST. art. V, §

18(b)(5); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-1121 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1.4683 (West 2002);
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'[j]udges as persons, or courts as institutions...
no greater immunity from criti268
cism than other persons or institutions.'
In reaching its conclusion, however, the Court noted several goals of the
various confidentiality requirements concerning judicial disciplinary proceedings. Among the goals are the encouragement of the filing of complaints and
the willing participation of relevant witnesses; the protection of judges from
injuries resulting from the publication of unexamined and unwarranted complaints; and the maintenance of confidence in the judiciary as an institution by
avoiding premature announcement of groundless claims of judicial misconduct.269 In addition, the Court suggested that the confidentiality requirements
could facilitate the work of the commissions by giving a judge the opportunity
to resign voluntarily or retire without the necessity of a formal proceeding in
cases where removal would be warranted. The requirements could also further
the goals of the commission by giving a judge the opportunity to be made aware
of minor complaints which may appropriately be called to his attention without
public notice in cases where the alleged misconduct is not of the magnitude to
warrant removal or even censure. 270 Thus, the Court acknowledged the tension
between the public's right to know and the valid purposes behind some confidentiality requirements.
Although the Court's holding was fairly limited,2 7 1 its reasoning tends to
support the idea that the public has a strong interest in receiving information
concerning judicial disciplinary proceedings, at least after formal charges have
been filed by the commission. This interest is arguably even stronger where the
public has placed the judge on the bench and where one day it may be called
upon to decide whether the judge should remain there.
Perhaps even more important than the right to examine information
concerning disciplinary proceedings is the right of members of the public to
view such proceedings themselves. Several commentators have argued in favor
of First Amendment right of access to post-investigative proceedings concerning
268
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the discipline of judges.27 2 The rationale for such a right stems from the line of
Supreme Court cases following Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.27 3 In
Globe, the Court articulated several justifications for permitting public access to
criminal trials that relate directly to the goal of accountability. According to
Globe, allowing public access to criminal trials helps "to ensure that [the] constitutionally protected 'discussion of government affairs' is an informed one. 274
Public access to criminal trials "fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby
heightening respect for the judicial process" and "permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process - an essential component
in our structure of self-government.,275

Several obstacles exist to recognizing such a constitutional right in the
case of judicial disciplinary proceedings, however. First, the Globe line of cases
deals only with criminal trials. Several courts have suggested that judicial disciplinary proceedings are not sufficiently analogous to fit within this mold.276
Compounding the problem is the fact that one of the chief justifications for recognizing a right of access to criminal trials in Globe was the fact that, even predating the Constitution, criminal trials had been open to the public, thus creating
a presumption of openness. 277 In contrast, JCOs are relatively recent creations,
and their proceedings2 78have historically lacked the same type of openness as exists in criminal trials.
Even if a right of access to judicial disciplinary proceedings is not constitutionally mandated, it is certainly desirable in elective states, at least in the
post-investigative phase. Currently, JCO formal hearings are confidential in at
least four states that use elections as the primary means of selecting judges.279
Public attendance at post-investigative judicial disciplinary proceedings would
not only serve the goal of accountability in the sense of keeping the public con272
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nected to the judiciary, it would also promote the ultimate goal of allowing the
public to be more informed about their judicial candidates and to make more
intelligent decisions. Indeed, the Model Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement created by the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility and State
Justice Institute require that all proceedings (except those related to a judge's
incapacity) shall be open to the public after the filing and service of formal
charges.28 ° Such a rule strikes the proper balance between the public's right to
know and a judge's interest in confidentiality. As the commentary explains,
"[o]nce the formal charges have been filed and served, there is no longer a danger that the charges are frivolous. 2 8' Once a JCO has determined that probable
cause exists to proceed with formal hearings, the public has a very real interest
in judging for itself the seriousness and credibility of the charges against a
judge. This interest is particularly compelling where the public is called upon to
decide whether the judge should be returned to the bench.
Limiting the electorate's access to disciplinary proceedings concerning
those whom the electorate has placed its trust can only weaken the public's trust
in the administration of justice. The perception exists in some quarters that JCOs
are reluctant to expose judges publicly. 2 2 Although a judge may have valid
privacy concerns about having relatively minor instances of judicial misconduct
memorialized on paper, which rival candidates can potentially use to their advantage during a campaign, such is the price of holding an elective office of
such great public trust. Popular elections carry with them certain drawbacks,
and states that employ popular elections as the principle means of selecting
judges have already made the decision that these drawbacks do not outweigh the
relative benefits of allowing the public to choose. Thus, if the public is to feel
confident that judges are not above the law and is to make a more informed decision, it must have the relevant facts in front of it.
2.

Educating the Public

Although greater access to disciplinary proceedings is a laudable goal,
the benefits of such access can only be realized if members of the electorate
actively seek out information concerning such proceedings. While members of
the public should certainly not be unduly limited in their ability to seek out information concerning the disciplinary process, such information should be more
readily available to them. In this regard, JCOs and reviewing courts are perfectly positioned to better educate the public about the general purposes of judicial discipline as well as individual cases of judicial misconduct.
For their part, JCOs can help improve accountability in states that use
elections to select their judges by increasing their educational efforts. Perhaps
280

MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. I1 (A)(2) (1994).

281 Id. at cmt. 27.
282

VOLCANSEK,

supra note 97, at 109.

2003]

"STOP ME BEFORE I VOTE FOR THIS JUDGEAGAIN"

the most obvious method of keeping the public informed is through the publication of annual reports designed for consumption by the public.283 For example,
Texas' State Commission on Judicial Conduct is required by law to develop and
distribute plain-language materials to judges and the public, including a description of the commission's responsibilities, the types of conduct that constitute
judicial misconduct, the types of sanctions issued by the commission, and the
commission's policies and procedures relating to complaint investigation and
resolution.2 4 In addition, the commission is required to routinely provide to
entities that provide education to judges information relating to judicial misconduct resulting in sanctions.285 By widely distributing such reports, JCOs not
only can be proactive in their attempts to deter future judicial misconduct, they
can also better educate the public about instances of judicial misconduct and the
purposes of judicial discipline generally.
Another way JCOs and courts can improve accountability is by clearly
and fully explaining the basis for any judicial disciplinary action taken against a
judge. Voters need to be able to understand the basis for any disciplinary action
taken against a judicial candidate. Written opinions serve as a way for a court to
explain to lawyers, future litigants, and the public at large why it has taken a
particular action. Although the primary readers of judicial opinions are, of
course, lawyers, written opinions can also serve as a way to keep the public informed about and connected with the courts. As Frances Kahn Zemans has
stated, judges can use their written opinions as an opportunity to "explain the
public policy value" of their decisions and to convince the reader of the soundness of the ruling.286 Such action not only helps to legitimize judicial decisions,
it can also educate the public.
In the case of disciplinary proceedings against judges in elective states,
courts and JCOs need to recognize that their primary audience is not so much
members of the bar, but the public at large. If part of the purpose of judicial
discipline is to ensure public confidence in the judiciary, the public needs to be
able to comprehend the reasons for a decision to impose a particular sanction.
As such, the reasoning behind a decision must be complete and it must be stated
in language that is understandable.287 Although it is virtually impossible for
courts to craft bright line rules for choosing between different forms of sanctions, judicial disciplinary opinions present a perfect opportunity for JCOs and
courts to educate the public not only about the importance of maintaining an
ethical judiciary, but about the relative gravity of the offense with which a judge
283
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is charged. Where the judicial misconduct at issue is relatively minor in nature,
the court can take steps to make this fact clear. Where the misconduct is more
severe, courts can explain exactly why the judge's conduct is unacceptable. In
either case, the public is in a better position to make a more informed decision
about a judge's qualifications.
As far as the courts themselves are concerned, candor in written opinions can go a long way toward promoting judicial accountability.2 88 Not only
can complete and forthright opinions educate the public about judicial candidates, they can also serve to improve public confidence in the judiciary.2 89 The
perception that judges protect their own is only exacerbated when courts write
cryptic opinions in their decisions concerning judicial discipline and omit information that might be relevant to a voter. All too often the fact that a judge
resigned from office during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings or was
defeated in a re-election bid results in an opinion by the reviewing court that is
completely lacking in detail as to the alleged misconduct or the reasons behind
the JCO's action or recommended action. 290 Similarly, courts will sometimes
declare further proceedings against a former judge moot because the judge has
resigned or was defeated.29 1
Although such actions are understandable as an attempt to avoid "piling
on" a disgraced judge, such actions do a disservice to the goals of judicial discipline and to the voters of the state. In order to promote the goal of reassuring
the public that certain types of judicial misconduct will not be tolerated, some
public comment by the reviewing court is necessary. As the Michigan Supreme
Court stated:
When a judge charged with misconduct removes himself from
judicial office to avoid the notoriety and ignominy incident to
disciplinary proceedings and the possibility of sanctions, censure, if deserved, may be essential to "the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system," especially if that integrity has
been critically undermined, because the alternative, silence,
may be construed by the public as an act of condonation.29 2
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Moreover, unless a court is empowered to impose sanctions in addition to removal, such as permanently enjoining a judge from holding future office or declaring the judge ineligible for retirement benefits, the fact that a judge has resigned or been defeated does not necessarily mean that the matter is moot. 293 If
nothing prevents a former judge from running for office again, the misconduct
at issue is arguably capable of repetition. It is certainly not unheard of for a
judge who has resigned or has been removed from office to seek judicial office
again.294 Thus, although it may be impossible to remove a judge who has already removed himself from office or whom the voters have removed, at a
minimum, public censure, accompanied by an explanation of the charges and
the reasoning behind the censure remains an appropriate option.295
VI. CONCLUSION
The popular election of judges and judicial misconduct are two realities
of the judiciary that will exist for the foreseeable future. JCOs and courts must
take steps to ensure that the reduction of instances of the latter does not unnecessarily intrude on the goals of the former. By and large, the removal mechanism of state JCOs has not unnecessarily undermined the public's right to
choose in states that employ judicial elections. Indeed, in many instances, removal of a judge from office via the recommendation of a JCO is simply a more
efficient manner of dealing with judicial misconduct than traditional methods of
judicial discipline. As the history of disciplinary proceedings illustrates, the
removal of judges through the JCO process has not proven a significant threat to
the goal of judicial independence, nor has it unduly infringed on the goal of judicial accountability.
In states with elective judiciaries, courts and JCOs can also be a potentially powerful force toward promoting greater accountability. If courts and
JCOs are to reach their full potential in this regard, however, states must be willing to allow the public to have reasonable access to their proceedings. Although
a certain degree of confidentiality in judicial disciplinary proceedings is essential, the public has a particularly strong interest in such proceedings in states
where judges are elected. Through their findings and written opinions, courts
and JCOs can help educate the voting public about the qualifications of a judge
and the judiciary as a whole.
By taking steps to keep the public informed about the results of judicial
misconduct investigations, JCOs and reviewing courts can not only help ensure
the continuation of an ethical judiciary, but help offset some of the weaknesses
inherent in the system of popular election of judges.
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